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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The DEMPATEM research project provides a comprehensive study of the employment gap 
which has grown between the USA and Europe since the 1970s. The gap largely coincides 
with a lower employment rate of service employment in Europe (exemplified by five 
countries which comprise 70 % of the EU population). Therefore, the research was as much 
a study of the scientific explanations for the role of services in the economy. The general 
research question concerned the impact of product demand patterns on the level of 
employment and their potential explanation for the transatlantic employment gap. The 
concise answer is: yes, demand patterns do affect employment levels, but compared to the 
level of demand the effect is small. Higher American employment relates to higher income 
and demand, which is largely – but not exclusively – achieved by higher employment 
participation and longer working hours. 
 
This answer rests on four different strands of research, which were combined: 
- analysis of aggregate demand components using data from input-output and national 
accounts statistics, with a special focus on private consumption; 
- analysis of household consumption behaviour, relating budget patterns to household 
characteristics including demographics, employment participation and income, on the 
basis of microdata from consumer budget surveys; 
- analysis of the employment effects of demand patterns considering the entire production 
chain in vertically integrated sectors based on input-output data; 
- analysis of the employment structure of services, focused on the main employment gap in 
private-sector services namely the distribution sector (trade, hotels and restaurants). 
Much effort was spent on the internationally uniform treatment of the data. 
 
First, the aggregate analysis confirmed that services do play a large role in final demand, 
primarily through public and private consumption which is more important in the USA than 
in Europe. The analysis also revealed the impact of institutional arrangements (public-private) 
concerning the provision of services, indicating that part of the gap in private-household 
service expenditures between the USA and Europe disappears once the public provision of 
individual services (e.g., health care) in Europe is taken into account. The remaining 
collective consumption is at similar levels in the USA and in Europe. The latter has a larger 
public sector because many services for individual consumption are provided through public 
channels. Generally, prices increased more for services than for goods, in line with Baumol’s  
cost disease, but even in constant prices the service share in final demand and especially in 
private consumption rose. 
 
Second, the analysis of household expenditure surveys showed a very limited impact of 
household characteristics on the evolution of the share of services in expenditures in each of 
the countries. The contribution is slightly larger in Europe. Among the household 
characteristics the expenditure level seems to be the most important for both relative 
service demand trends over time and the transatlantic differences. Overall, the shift towards 
services runs parallel between the USA and Europe with the USA at a higher level. These 
results were achieved on the basis of micro data internationally standardized in expenditures 
and households characteristics and limited to those expenditures (between 55 and 75 per 
cent of total) which are unaffected by the institutional differences of public/private provision. 
 
Third, the analysis of product demand on employment based on vertically integrated sectors, 
which take the whole production chain into account, showed that the employment-
intensities of services and goods demand are roughly equal. The changing mix of 
consumption has, in general, been only a minor source of employment growth within each 
economy. The final demand structures of the UK, the Netherlands and Spain would generate 
higher employment in the USA than the American final demand pattern does, while the 
consumption patterns of France and Germany would reduce American employment by 5 to 
7 per cent. In the USA, demand growth has been more strongly job-creating and 
productivity gains were less strongly job-destroying than in the European economies, 
opening up the employment gap. Overall, the levels of demand play a much more important 
role for the transatlantic employment gap than the structures of demand. 
 
Finally, the employment analysis showed that the employment gap largely coincides with 
services employment. The declines in agriculture and manufacturing, however, are largely 
responsible for the growth of the gap. The services gap per se grew relatively little and 
notably decreased in recent years, on a head-count basis. 
Within services, retailing and hotels and catering play a prominent role for the gap. In all 
countries their work force is biased towards women, youth and the low skilled. However, 
on the pay side the wage structure of retailing relative to the rest of the economy provides 
no convincing evidence that, in comparison to Europe, US retailing profits from higher wage 
flexibility offering possibilities of paying lower wages. Notably, no particular contribution was 
found for pay differentials at low levels of skill nor at the bottom end of the wage 
distribution. 
 More rapid productivity growth in European distribution did contribute to the jobs gap in 
distribution but only in the 1970s and not during the two later decades. The much higher 
macroeconomic level of goods consumption per capita in the USA as compared to Europe is 
particularly important for explaining the gap in retail employment and this substantially 
mitigates the importance of potential constraining effects of wages and productivity. 
 
In the 1970s the USA achieved a higher per-capita income through a higher level of 
productivity but productivity in France, the Netherlands and West Germany has caught up 
and by the end of the last century the income gap between the USA and these countries 
roughly corresponded to the labour-input gap. The UK and Spain, by contrast, still have 
lower productivity levels. The shift of the causes of the American income advantage from 
production technology to labour input is hard to explain with conventional macroeconomic 
arguments because it requires substantial changes in labour supply and consumption 
behaviour. It is a pressing question for further research beyond the DEMPATEM program 
why the USA raised labour input so much and why the European countries fail to achieve 
higher participation: preferences or constraints?  
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1 INTRODUCTION: DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND 
DIFFERENT DEMAND PATTERNS? 
 
In this chapter, after a short overview of the employment gap, we discuss the hypotheses 
that could explain it, particularly the contribution of services. Next we present the strategy 
of the DEMPATEM project to investigate the hypotheses. 
 
1.1 US-EUROPE DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYMENT 
By the turn of the century the share of the employed among the working-age population in 
the USA was about 10%-points higher than in many (although not all) European countries. 
When measured in working hours instead of persons the differences in employment trends 
are even more pronounced (see Schettkat 2004). Over long periods of time, net 
employment growth has been absorbed almost entirely by service industries causing changes 
of ‘revolutionary proportions’ (Victor Fuchs in his influential 1968 NBER study ‘The Service 
Economy’). The United States took the lead in the shift to service employment and by the 
year 2001 55 % of all Americans in working age were employed in service industries 
compared to 47 in France, 43 in Germany, and 52 in the UK. Not surprisingly the ability to 
expand services is seen as the key-solution to Europe’s employment problem. In the 
European Commission’s contribution to the ‘Special European Council Meeting’ in Lisbon 
(March 2000) Europe’s employment deficit compared to the USA was rightly identified as a 
‘service gap’ (European Commission 2000: 5). 
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Source: for detailed values see Schettkat 2004. 
 
In the 1970s Europe
1 had a slightly higher share of its working-age (15 to 64 years) 
population in employment than the USA but the latter produced a substantially higher 
income. The USA was the technological leader but in the following decades European 
countries caught up to US productivity levels and by the year 2000 France, Germany and 
Netherlands had roughly converged to US productivity levels while the UK and Spain 
remained at substantially lower levels (Gordon 2002, Schettkat 2004). Thus, the differences 
in per capita income between the first three countries and the USA reflect at the aggregate 
level almost entirely differences in labour input but for the UK and Spain there remains a 
productivity differential. The different trends on both sides of the Atlantic can be illustrated 
in a stylized way in supply-demand space as in Figure 1.1. 
 
The solid line in Figure 1.1 represents constant employment rates (the number of employed 
divided by population in working age) at different levels of productivity (iso-employment 
                                                  
1   Europe is often used in this project as a shortcut for the European countries included in the 
DEMPATEM project, i.e. France, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, UK,  
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curves). An increase in productivity moves the economy further to the origin and this 
increase in supply capacity needs to be compensated by growing product demand to keep 
employment rates constant. In 1970 the European countries and the USA had different 
productivity levels but they were all roughly on the same ‘iso-employment curve’. Income 
per capita and overall demand in the USA was higher because the American economy 
produced at a higher productivity level. By the 1990s the USA and the European economies 
are on distinctively different ‘employment curves’. In the USA productivity increased but less 
than in the European countries, bringing some European countries (France, West-Germany, 
the Netherlands) at roughly the same productivity level. At the same time, however, demand 
in the US economy grew substantially more than productivity moving the USA to a position 
above the original ‘iso-employment curve’. Expressed in demand-supply space, the USA 
move in the vertical direction (demand) exceeded the move in the horizontal direction 
(supply, productivity). The reverse trend occurred in the European countries, where 
productivity growth was higher than the expansion of demand moving these countries below 
the original ‘iso-employment curve’. These trends would even be more pronounced if hours 
worked rather than persons employed would be used. 
At the same time, the share of the working-age population employed in services advanced in 
the USA from 38 % in 1970 to 55 % in 2001 but remained at lower levels in Europe 
increasing from 30 % to 45 % for the aggregate of the five countries studied in the project: 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Thus, employment is 
growing in service industries and the US-Europe employment gap is overwhelmingly located 
in services. Obviously the American and the European economies experienced quite 
different changes, which can hardly be classified as business cycle phenomena nor is it very 
easy to see that the changes are related to shocks like the oil-price increases of the 1970s. If 
shocks had acted as a cause for the transatlantic differences in economic trends, they should 
have moved the economies on different development trajectories. 
Table 1.1 shows employment measured by employment-population rates (aged 15-64 years) 
and final demand and consumption per head of the population in the same age bracket by 
broad sectors as a percentage of the American figures. Many European countries have 
employment and final demand figures close to or even higher than the USA in manufacturing 
but the gaps are substantial for services. Somehow the major difference between the USA 




Table 1.1: Employment, final demand and private household consumption per head of population (15-
64 years, US=100, 1995) 
 US*  UK*  FR  DE  NL  ES 
  Employment (FTEs) 
Overall 100  86.4  78.6  87.6  77.6  69.8 
Agriculture 100  73.7  143.3  94.3  105.6  189.9 
Manufacturing 100  109.1  93.3  137.4  88.6  94.3 
Services 100  81.9  71.9  70.7  73.4  58.1 
  Final Demand 
Overall 100  78.3  70.7  65.2  82.9  50.1 
Agriculture 100  112.8  91.0  56.3  234.9  94.8 
Manufacturing 100  94.8  92.8  88.9  99.9  62.4 
Services 100  67.6  59.8  54.1  72.0  43.4 
  Consumption 
Overall 100  70.3  63.3  54.8  56.8  42.6 
Agriculture 100  141.9  150.6  93.8  47.5  129.0 
Manufacturing 100  90.1  83.7  59.1  38.2  49.8 
Services 100  63.0  58.2  53.6  60.9  40.5 
* US data refers to 1998, UK data refers to 1997 
Source: Computations based on OECD Input-Output database for demand and STAN for employment. 
 
Obviously the higher employment rates in the USA compared to Europe are related to 
differences in demand levels and the higher share of service-sector employment suggests 
that also the structure of product demand differs between the two sides of the Atlantic, 
which may also affect employment levels. 
 
1.2 HYPOTHESES EXPLAINING THE GROWTH IN SERVICE EMPLOYMENT 
Many hypotheses have been advanced to explain the US-European employment gap. Most 
prominent is the ‘inequality’ hypothesis2 stating that job creation in the USA is achieved with 
the help of high and rising wage inequality. Often the analysis is confined to the labour 
market assuming a direct relation between wages and labour demand but often it is argued 
that higher wage inequality allows technologically stagnant service industries to expand in the 
USA., whereas rigid European wage and labour market structures impedes the expansion of 
service employment and results in high unemployment especially among low-skilled workers. 
This hypothesis fits the aggregated trends fairly well and established the basis for many policy 
initiatives in European countries aimed at making wage structures more flexible. American 
wage inequality rose and always was substantially higher than in Europe even after 
controlling for skills (Freeman and Schettkat 1999). In Europe, by contrast, wage differentials 
remained roughly stable or even declined in some countries, for example in West-Germany 
                                                  
2    Institutional ‘wage compression’ is the synonym.  
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(Freeman and Schettkat 1999). As much as the ‘inequality’ or ‘wage compression hypothesis’ 
seems to be in accordance with the aggregate stylized facts, detailed studies have failed to 
produce convincing evidence in support of this hypothesis (Bell and Nickell 1996, Krueger 
and Pischke 1999, Freeman and Schettkat 2001). There appears to be no correlation 
between industry wage structure and industry employment levels or growth. 
 
Second is the ‘cost disease’ hypothesis, which dominates the literature on structural 
economic change (for an overview Schettkat and Yocarini 2003). It follows a reverse 
reasoning for the explanation of the rising service-sector employment. Assuming that wages 
grow at similar rates across the industries, which can be actually observed (see Chapter 6), 
Baumol (1967, 2001) argued that employment in technologically stagnant services expands 
and that relative prices of these services increase because with rising income a constant 
proportion of demand is going into services. 
 
These two hypotheses, the ‘inequality’ and the ‘cost disease’ hypothesis, mark the extremes 
of assumptions concerning the functioning of labour markets and the price elasticity of 
demand in product markets. The inequality hypothesis assumes highly elastic reactions to 
price variations, whereas the cost-disease hypothesis is based on inelastic demand reactions.3 
In addition, the literature on structural change (for an overview: Schettkat and Yocarini 
2003) also emphasizes shifts in product-demand patterns as the income of countries rises 
(‘income’ hypothesis). According to this hypothesis relative service demand increases with 
rising income because services are regarded as luxuries.4 The various hypotheses 
emphasizing the growth and international differences in service-sector employment can be 
summarized in demand-supply space as developed below. 
 
The share of service-sector employment results from differences in relative product demand 
















where E = employment, Y = real demand, A = productivity, s = subscript for services,  • = 
overall economy 
These two variables, relative demand (α= Ys / Y•) and relative productivity (β = Ai / A•), 
describe the spectrum of hypotheses that explain the rising shares of service-sector 
                                                  
3   Or at least on income and price effects balancing each other (Appelbaum and Schettkat xx…) 
4   Luxuries are products with income elasticity greater than one. 
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employment. It is marked by hypotheses emphasizing changes in product demand in favour 
of services (Fisher 1935, Clark 1951) and hypotheses emphasizing supply-side effects, i.e. 
unbalanced productivity growth and assuming constant product demand proportions 
(Baumol 1967, 2001). For Fisher (1935) and Clark (1951) it was relative saturation of 
demand for manufacturing products and a shift of demand to services, which caused service 
employment to expand.5 Measured in constant prices the share of services in final demand 
(α) will rise according to their hypothesis and changes in relative productivity (β = Ai / A•) 
are regarded as relatively unimportant. Baumol (1967, 2001) challenged this view with a 
radical supply-side hypothesis. He assumed the share of service demand in final demand (the 
αs) to be constant but the productivity ratio (β = Ai / A•) to decline with the advancement 
of the economies. 
William Baumol assumed constant employment-population rates and constant working 
hours. Thus income (per capita) in his model depends on overall productivity growth in the 
economy. If services are technologically stagnant, the relative service-sector productivity (β) 
depends on the advancement of the economy, which depends entirely on productivity trends 
in the non-service part of the economy (say manufacturing). Therefore, given this 
assumption, relative service-sector productivity (β) should be lower in the more advanced 
economies because high incomes in these economies are the result of rising productivity in 
the technologically progressive goods production. However, due to theoretical and empirical 
reasons, comparative inter-industry-productivity levels must remain a theoretical 
construction (Baumol and Wolf 1984, Glyn et al. 2004) and cannot be observed directly. 
 
According to the very influential model of Baumol, rising income is spent in fixed real 
proportions on goods and services and therefore employment in the technologically stagnant 
service industries will rise.6 Measured in current prices expenditures on services will expand, 
because wages in technologically stagnant services rise at the same rate as in technologically 
progressive industries, that is manufacturing. The equilibrating mechanism of functioning 
markets (financial and labour markets) and differential productivity growth leads to the ‘cost-
disease’ of services. For this reason industry-specific value added per worker in current 
prices (productivity) cannot be used as an indicator for industry-specific productivity 
(Baumol and Wolf 1984). In the Baumol model the effect of rising incomes through 
technological progress in goods production in connection with technological stagnancy of 
                                                  
5   For a more comprehensive overview of theories of structural change see Schettkat and Yocarini, 2003. 
6   What may be the rational for constant αs? One possibility is that there is no substitution between 
goods and services, i.e. that it is a Leontief-type utility function (Schettkat 2004 for a more 
comprehensive discussion). Another possibility is that positive income elasticity and negative price 
elasticity of service demand just compensate (Appelbaum and Schettkat, 2001). 
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services and not a shift of demand away from goods to services (in real terms) is causing 
service employment to grow. In Baumol’s analysis the βs are causing the observed change in 
employment structures but the αs – demand structures – are constant. 
According to the Baumol the difference in service-employment shares between the USA and 
Europe results from higher per-capita income in the USA caused by a higher level of 
productivity in American goods production.7 This model is very much in line with the 
observation of the USA and Europe being on the same ‘iso-employment curve’ but at 
different income levels due to productivity differences in 1970 (compare Figure 1.1). 
However, the ‘cost disease’ hypothesis seems to fit the American-European differences less 
well in the more recent period, when many European countries reached productivity levels 
similar to the USA and now the income-per-capita difference seems to be strongly 
influenced by differences in labour supply, i.e. Europe and the USA are on very different ‘iso-
employment curves’ (compare Figure 1.1). 
 
As discussed above, the extent to which relative prices for services rise, depends on relative 
productivity growth but also on relative wage growth. Wage differentiation became the main 
explanation for differences in price levels between the USA and Europe (‘inequality’ 
hypothesis). Flexible and widely differentiated wages in the USA., as against rigid and 
constricted wages in Europe, so goes the story, allowed for an expansion of low-skill, low-
wage service industries in the USA. Given similar technological conditions in these 
industries, this option was blocked in Europe by rigid wages, causing overly high prices for 
services. The ‘inequality’ hypothesis shares many aspects with Baumol’s model but relaxes 
Baumol’s assumption of competitive labour markets and assumes wages to be differentiated 
according to industry productivity, which requires imperfect labour markets. 
Baumol assumed income per capita to rise through technological progress. Actually, 
however, income levels (income per capita) are the outcome of the share of the population 
in employment (employment-population rates), average working hours and labour 
productivity. In his seminal studies, Fuchs (1968, 1980) confirmed that demand for services is 
relatively constant when measured in constant prices but he added complexity by arguing 
that not only the level of income per capita but also the way a certain income level is 
achieved affects the structure of demand. A high degree of female labour force participation 
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will necessarily reduce household production, which may then be substituted by market 
services and goods (Freeman and Schettkat 2002). Thus, the income level may change over 
time or may differ between two countries because participation and/or hours worked 
change, most likely affecting also expenditure patterns.  
Figure 1.2 summarizes the major hypotheses put forward for the rising share of service 
employment  and for the US-Europe differences in service employment. 
 
Figure 1.2  The major stylized hypotheses for the explanation of rising (or higher)) service 
employment as summarized in demand-supply space 
α  Relative demand for services increases 
Fisher/Clark, income hypothesis 
β ↓ Relative productivity of services declines 
Baumol, cost disease hypothesis 
β ↓ and α ↑  Relative service productivity declines but also
demand patterns shift in favour of services 
Fuchs, composition hypothesis 
β ↓ but cost disease cured Relative service productivity declines but the cost
disease effect is offset by falling service sector wages in
the USA but not in Europe 
Contemporary European economist, 
inequality hypothesis 

















1.3 THE DEMPATEM RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Obviously, which one of the hypotheses actually holds is an empirical question the 
DEMPATEM project tried to answer. However, even if the structure of real demand turns 
out to be constant over time, the question remains at which level it occurs. At the aggregate 
level because diverging trends in the subcomponents of demand compensate, at the level of 
household expenditures, government consumption, etc. For example, the differences in 
relative final demand for services may be due to differences in the weights of the various 
aggregate final-demand components (private consumption, government consumption, 
investment, imports, exports) and differences in service shares within these components, 
which again may be caused by differences in income levels, tastes, prices, household 
composition, specialization in the economy. Furthermore, as has been argued by William 
Baumol, the share of service employment may increase even without any changes in relative 
real demand for services, but only through the lack of productivity growth in service 
activities. Rising income in combination with unbalanced productivity growth can result in 
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the expansion of service employment. Thus, the analysis of the employment structure is 
necessarily complex and there can hardly be a straightforward answer to why one country 
has a higher share of service employment than another. 
 
It seems to be necessary to go beyond the aggregate analysis and to analyze the full 
complexity of the causality chains as DEMPATEM did. DEMPATEM intended to provide a 
contribution to a better understanding of the mechanisms that created the American-
European employment gap, thus giving impetus to the general debate on employment 
policies in Europe. DEMPATEM looked simultaneously at the product market and the labour 
market in a systematic and comparative fashion, using different data sources. To our 
knowledge DEMPATEM was the first project developing such an integrated approach, 
spanning product and labour markets in an international comparison of employment trends 
and their causes. Changing structures are related to long-term changes and the relevant 
periods here are the 1970s to 1990s. 
  
DEMPATEM broke down the major dimension causing changes or inter-country differences 
in relative service-sector employment – shifts in the final demand patterns, inter-industry 
productivity differentials, inter-industry division of labour – into sub-dimensions as illustrated 
in Figure 1.3 and tried to answer specifically the following six major questions grouped 
according to the three major dimensions. 
 
Consequently, DEMPATEM analysed the full complexity of the differences in industry 
structure of employment using the USA as the benchmark country. The major questions 
were: 
 
Dimension A (Final Demand) 
1.  Does the higher share of service-industry employment in the USA derive from a 
larger role of services in the structure of final demand, and is this gap growing? 
2.  Particularly, is consumer demand higher and growing more rapidly in the US? What 
is its impact on the production of services? 
3.  What is the role of the pattern of consumption in this? That is, do American 
households consume more services than European and why? 
4. What determines the pattern of consumption? What role do household 
characteristics, including labour market participation, income inequality and 
consumer attitudes play? 
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Dimension B (Inter-industry Division of Labour) 
5.  How does consumer spending on services translate into the structure of production 
and employment? 
 
Dimension C (Inter-industry Productivity Differentials) 
6.  What is the structure of employment in these industries by skills, gender, age, 
and pay? And how does this depend on female labour supply? And what are 
the effects on productivity? 
 




Final demand   
   Private consumption  Household expenditures; 
Household structure; 
Household income; 
Household labour force participation. 
   Government consumption   
   Investment   
   Exports/imports   
Industry productivity  Skills; 
Capital-labour ratios; 
Working hours. 
Inter-industry division of labour  Input-output structure; 
Vertically integrated sectors; 
Final-product employment. 
 
Firstly, DEMPATEM analysed changes at the aggregate level and differences between the 
major final-demand components (private consumption, government consumption and 
investment), the impact of the financing mode on private expenditures (public versus 
private), price trends, and aggregate income and demand trends. Secondly, DEMPATEM 
provided a detailed micro-econometric analysis of the structure of private consumption, 
taking into account household structure (demographics) and labour-force participation. This 
detailed microanalysis of private consumption expenditures offers important insights into 
international differences in spending behaviour, but will need to be restricted in order to 
create internationally comparable expenditure categories. Thirdly, DEMPATEM investigated 
the impact of the final-demand structure, and the inter-industry division of labour on the 
employment structure, expressed in terms of the institutional division of the NIPA. Finally, 
DEMPATEM analysed whether changes and inter-country differences in the composition of 
the workforce within industries, as well as in capital deepening and in hours worked, 
contribute to the explanation of differences in service-sector employment. 
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Demand patterns were analysed in an internationally comparative way, not only at the 
aggregate level but also at the level of individual households. Although many studies dealing 
with structural change implicitly include the structure of demand, almost nowhere is it 
analyzed in a rigorous way, and there seems to be no study analyzing changes in the final-
demand structure at both the aggregate and the micro level. Despite its focus on demand, 
DEMPATEM should not be seen as an “‘all depends on final demand” project. For its 
emphasis lies on the structure of final demand and its underlying forces, not simply on the 
aggregate level of final demand, though this may be an important determinant of the level of 
employment. The inter-industry division of labour, and intra-industry productivity differences 
will also be included in the analysis. 
 
The building blocks of the DEMPATEM projects can be summarized as in Figure 1.4. 
 
In the following chapters we will discuss these issues. Starting from a summary consideration 
of the concept of services and its share in employment (Chapter 2) we consecutively discuss 
aggregate demand (Chapter 3), consumer demand in relation to consumer households 
(Chapter 4), the structure of production (Chapter 5) and employment in relation to wages, 
productivity and consumer demand (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 lists our conclusions. 
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2 SERVICE-SECTOR EXPANSION 
 
2.1 WHY IS DEMPATEM EMPHASIZING SERVICES? 
‘Service’ is an amorphous concept (Griliches, 1992) that lacks a clear-cut definition, even 
though many efforts have been made to clearly distinguish services from goods. In a way, all 
products are composite products. Even the haircutter needs a pair of scissors, a chair, a 
room but also goods need services as intermediate inputs. Is the observation that service-
sector employment expands then just an artefact because some inputs are arbitrarily labelled 
‘services’? Very common is the assumption that service-sector employment in the USA is 
higher because manufacturing firms specialize and outsource service activities to specialized 
service providers whereas manufacturing firms in Europe provide these services in-house. 
According to the conventions of National Accounting, employees would be classified as 
service workers in the former case but as manufacturing workers in the latter case although 
they perform exactly the same tasks (this is the outsourcing hypothesis, see above). 8 
However, outsourcing is not causing the transatlantic difference in relative service-sector 
employment (see Gregory and Russo 2004, Chapter 5 of this paper, and Russo and 
Schettkat 2001).9
Although the distinction between services and goods is not sharp, some differences can be 
listed. Services cannot be stored, and the production and consumption of services (often) 
occur simultaneously. Services may therefore require time both from their producer and 
from their consumer (Petit, 2000). Examples are haircuts, tennis lessons and the like. In 
several cases, the quality of the service depends on the participation of the consumer 
(Griliches, 1992: 5), as in the case of education, where a tutor will achieve nothing without 
her student’s cooperation. To assert that services are time consuming, would be an invalid 
generalization, however. Consultancy, tax and cleaning services, for example, may be aimed 
at saving the ‘consumer’s’ time. There are also activities that are classified as services, but 
which cannot easily be distinguished from goods-production activities. ‘Car repairs’, for 
example, are classified as services, although roughly 70% of the time spent on a car repair 
can be classified as goods rather than service production (Freeman and Schettkat, 1999).  
                                                  
8   Sometimes it is argued that services depend on good production; i.e. nobody can live on services alone. 
This is true, but it does not mean that services cannot capture a big share of the economy. We still 
need agriculture, but only a very small fraction of the labour force is occupied in agriculture and still 
production is higher than ever. The reason is that productivity growth in agriculture has outpaced 
demand growth, leading to a decline in agricultural employment. Similarly, manufacturing employment 
may decline sharply for the same reason: productivity rising faster than demand. For many services, 
however, the reverse holds (Gregory and Russo 2003). 
9   Classifying workers according to their occupations into service and production workers leaves the 
transatlantic gap in service employment unchanged (Freeman and Schettkat  2001) 
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An important distinction is by the main user of the service, i.e. whether it is an intermediate 
or a consumer services (including public services) although most services are intermediate 
and final at the same time (Schettkat and Yocarini 2003). The major question probably is, 
whether the specialized provision of a service delivers a productivity gain for individual firms, 
households and the society as a whole. Therefore, it may be useful to distinguish services 
requiring expertise, that is services in which the professional provider has a productivity 
advantage, from services that do not require expertise and for which the productivity 
differential between market provision (buying) and self-provision is minimal. 
An additional problem is that measuring the quality of services is extremely difficult, i.e. the 
‘apples and oranges problem’.10 Does a shop provide a better service if it has longer opening 
hours or if it arranges its goods more nicely? It is often thought that output measurements 
are easier in the manufacturing industry than in the service sector because output is more 
homogeneous (Griliches, 1992: 7). Although this argument has certain validity, quality 
changes in manufacturing products have also been difficult to measure (Gordon 1990, 
Gordon, 1998, Oi and Rosen, 1992,). This has been a problem ever since the National 
Income and Product Accounts statistics were first created and it has never fully been 
solved.11 
 
Professional services, such as legal advice, tax and accounting consultancies, are bought in 
the market because it would be impossible for each household or small firm to gain the 
necessary expertise. The concentration of expertise in certain professions thus creates 
‘economies of scale’ as the huge ‘fixed investment’ in human capital can be spread over many 
users. Because of such economies of scale, services requiring professional expertise can be 
acquired much cheaper from external providers than by internal provision. This helps to 
explain why firms outsource some services rather than produce them in-house. 
Professionalisation, it is often argued, mainly affects so-called business services, but the 
distinction between business and consumer services is rather blurred. Legal and tax advice, 
for example, are also ‘consumed’ by private households and the professionalisation 
advantage also works for many consumer services. Private households may also apply the 
principle of opportunity costs when deciding whether to purchase services or to opt for self-
provision. Especially if the service requires little expertise, like cleaning. The productivity of 
                                                  
10   Services and their quality changes formed the heart of the debates about the validity of the US CPI 
(Consumer Price Index), see: Boskin et al. 1998, Abraham et al. 1998. 
11   OECD (1996) gives an overview of various methods used to estimate real value added in services 
ranging from double deflation – regarded as preferable (page 7) – to direct deflation by a wage rate 
index. 
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such services will be roughly equal for self-provision and purchased services, thus making the 
price of professional service provision a key variable (Schettkat, 2002).
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So, why did DEMPATEM focus so much on services while services are not a clear-cut 
category? There are several answers: 
•  The major differences in employment-population rates between the USA and 
Europe occur in service industries. The Employment in Europe 2002 report of the 
European Commission shows (page 29) that the difference in sectoral employment 
structure between the EU and the USA is entirely in service industries. 
•  Service industries are the only industries showing net employment growth. 
•  Services are assumed to have a high income elasticity (investigated in the 
DEMPATEM Consumption project). 
•  Services are assumed to be technologically stagnant or at least asymptotically 
stagnant and services are therefore assumed to experience higher price rises than 
goods.  
•  Services are assumed to be less capital and more labour intensive 
•  Service demand mainly affects the domestic economy and inter-country service 
demand differences may be especially relevant for employment 
•  Services are assumed to have a higher employment elasticity of product demand. 
DEMPATEM investigated many of these assumption (e.g. the income elasticity of demand in 
the consumption sub-project, employment elasticity in the input-output sub-project). 
 
2.2 REGULARITIES IN SERVICE-EMPLOYMENT EXPANSION 
Victor Fuchs (1980) developed a non-linear model of the development of the share of 
service employment in overall employment assuming that the share of service employment is 
zero at very low levels of GDP but that it grows with GDP per capita, asymptotically 
approaching one. The share of agricultural employment, on the other hand, starts at one and 
then decreases with GDP asymptotically approaching zero. Fuchs could show that the rising 
share of service-sector employment follows a regularity seldom found in economics. The 
coefficients of correlation between the actual service share in employment and the values 
predicted with Fuchs’s model were between 0.80 and 0.99. Applying Victor Fuchs’ model to 
more recent data shows again that Fuchs’s model predicts the share of services in overall 
employment remarkably well. 
                                                  
12   Taking set-up costs into account (for example, travel time to the place of service provision) may 
increase the efficiency advantage of self-provision even further 
15  
Figure 2.1 shows estimates produced with the Fuchs model for more recent American time-
series data and the actual position of the European DEMPATEM countries. The figure shows 
that countries such as the Netherlands, France and the UK reach even higher service 
employment shares than the predicted US shares at certain levels of per capita income. 
Germany, on the other hand, is systematically below the predicted values. However, the 
employment shares are based on persons and it has to be kept in mind though, that 
(diverging) hours worked are not accounted for. If a large part of employment in the service 
sector works part-time (as in the Netherlands), these employment shares will overestimate 
the size of the service sector. Table 2.5 suggests they do, because hours per person 
employed are lower in service industries than in the rest of the economy although hours 
worked seem to be difficult to measure (see Schettkat 2004). 
 
Figure 2.1 Predicted service share in US employment and actual values UK, Netherlands, Germany, 
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Fuchs pointed out that accurate and stable predictions are not so common in economics and 
he explicitly mentioned that one has to be aware that these results are “not tests of 
theoretically grounded hypotheses”. No appropriate economic theory has been developed 
to explain this phenomenon. Consequently, a major question is why this pattern is so 
persistent. Is it due to shifts in demand, a new industrial division of labour (outsourcing), or 
was Baumol correct in pointing at differential productivity growth in the different sectors? 
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How can it be that GDP per capita influences these factors so consistently even in such 
widely diverging institutional frameworks and differences in growth processes (see above)? 
The regularities are the result of many variables pulling the service share in different 




3 DEMAND TRENDS 
 
3.1 RELATIVE PRICES OF SERVICES AND PRICE TRENDS 
It is a commonly held belief that services are relatively cheaper in the USA than in Europe 
and that they are consequently in higher demand there but the EU-OECD project on 
purchasing-power-parities (OECD 2002) has revealed the opposite. Goods rather than 
services are relatively cheap in the USA whereas the reverse holds in most European 
countries as illustrated in Figure 3.1, which shows the ratio of consumer-service prices to 
that of prices for goods. In other words, one dollar buys more services but less goods in 
Europe. This seems to contradict the hypothesis that the American service sector is bigger 
than its European counterpart due to a more service-friendly price structure. 
 








US UK FR GER NL ES
 
Source: computations are based on OECD 2002. 
 
The standard textbook model assumes substitutability and utility maximization and suggests 
that the product with the higher relative price will be substituted by the product with the 
lower price. If utility functions are homeothetic, services should be in higher demand in the 
country with the lower price level. Thus Europe should experience a higher share of services 
in final demand. Price effects, however, can be overruled by income effects, and American 
income per capita is higher. 
Investigating the price structure for individual consumer services shows that relative prices 
of only a few but quantitatively important services – health and education – are lower than 
relative prices in the USA, while other services – especially those traded in markets (like 
hotels, restaurants, recreational and cultural services) – have a markedly higher relative price 
in Europe. The two European low-price industries, health and education, are characterized 
by a mix of public and private provision and/or financing and they are not a good indicator of 
actual market prices. Nevertheless, government involvement in health and education, which 
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especially in health is stronger in Europe than in the USA, does seem to reduce the price 
level in these industries. 
 
How did prices in various categories of private-household consumption develop over time? 
Based on implicit price deflators,
13 prices of services rose more than those for goods but this 
was the net result of heterogeneous trends within the service sector (see Schettkat 2004). 
 
3.2 PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE DEMAND 
Whether a specific service is classified as public or as private household consumption 
(usually including consumption of non-profit organization serving private households) 
strongly depends on national institutional arrangements. Pension insurance, for example, may 
be organized by the government or by private companies. To take these differences into 
account, the latest 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) splits government consumption 
into a part that can be regarded as individual consumption and another part that is ‘pure’ 
collective consumption. Adding together private household expenditures (including 
expenditures of non-profit institutions serving households) and individual consumption 
expenditures by government gives total individual consumption expenditures, on a 
comparable basis across countries. 
The European countries (except the UK) appear to consume about 5 percentage-points less 
of their GDP than the USA (the Netherlands even 9%-points, see Figure 3.2, upper panel), 
which is largely due to positive net exports. In a typical European country government 
consumption is between 25 and 35% of final consumption (Table 3.2, middle panel) but in 
the USA this is only 17%. However, the split of government consumption between collective 
and individual consumption corrects this pattern: in Europe about 60% of government 
consumption is individual and only 40% is collective whereas in the USA this is exactly the 
opposite. Thus, in Europe the public sector seems to be an important provider of individual 
consumption items, which are provided privately in the USA (see also Freeman and Rein, 
1988). 
Taking the split of government consumption into ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ at face value, the 
share of collective consumption in overall final consumption reveals a surprising result: 
except for the Netherlands, all countries spend about 10% of overall final consumption on 
collective consumption (Figure 3.2, lower panel). The USA now looks like a typical European 
state with a level of collective consumption similar to Sweden! However, considering that 
                                                  
13   Implicit price deflators are indirectly derived from the comparison of current-price and constant-price 
expenditures, i.e. they are influenced by quantity reaction to price changes. Therefore, they are 
different from price trends based on the price comparisons for specific items.  
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Sweden consumes only 77% of its GDP but the USA 82%, leaves Sweden with 7.6% 
collective consumption out of GDP compared to a higher 8.7% in the USA. 
 
Figure 3.2  The share of final consumption in GDP and government consumption, individual and 
collective consumption in final consumption (1999) 
1
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Source: computations based on OECD 2002 
 
Government expenditures are almost entirely concentrated in services as the OECD input-
output data reveals (Table 3.1). Aside from public administration, governments are engaged 
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in ‘research and development, ‘education’ and ‘health’. At least 75% of the final demand in 
education is government demand and in many cases it is well above 90%. Given that most 
schools are public and free of charge in the USA (see Schmitt, 2003) the US figures in Table 
3.1 simply reflect convention of the American NIPA system and cannot be interpreted
.14 The 
health sector is a bit more diverse, illustrating the differences in the organizational structure 
between countries. In Germany, for example, health insurance is compulsory for most 
employees. Almost everybody is covered by a health insurance, but about three quarters of 
health expenditures are classified as private because insurance and service providers are 
mostly private organizations.
15 In other countries, like France, the Netherlands and the UK 
health services are organized through public funds or are provided publicly resulting in a 
government share of three quarters in spending on health services. 
 
Table 3.1: The Share Government Consumption in Final Demand of Detailed Service Industries, 1995.  
 US  UK  F  GER  NL  ES 
Agriculture 7.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  1.3 
Industry 15.7  0.0  3.1  0.5  8.3  3.9 
Services  18.8  29.2 40.5 37.6 43.9 30.5 
         
In detailed services:             
Wholesale and Retail trade, Repairs  2.3  0.0  4.6  0.0  4.5  3.6 
Hotels, Restaurants  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.3 
Transport, Storage  14.3  0.0  2.1  5.9  23.0  4.2 
Post, Communication  13.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7 
Finance, Insurance  4.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.0 
Real Estate Activities  2.1  0.0  7.8  0.0  4.6  0.0 
Computer & related act.  67.7  .  0.0  0.0  0.0  13.1 
R&D  98.9 0.0 99.8 72.4  100.0 99.1 
Other business activities  26.6  0.0  0.0  0.8  41.4  6.6 
Public Administration, Defence, Social 
Security  100.0  94.6 99.9 98.8 94.0 97.4 
Education  -27.4  54.5 91.4 80.0 96.6 76.5 
Health and Social Work  -10.5  81.7  75.8  8.2  74.8  64.9 
Other  Services  -0.1  12.7 12.9 14.5 19.4 18.5 
Source: computation based on the OECD input output database, tables for total demand. US figures refer to 1997 
 
Thus, a major difference between the USA and the European countries is the degree to 
which individual consumption is provided through the public sector. Government 
                                                  
14   Nadim Ahmad from OECD kindly clarified this and other input-output issues to us. In the US all value 
added of the public sector, the production, is booked in ‘public administration’. The negative numbers 
in education and health reflect purchases of the public sector, for example private payments for meals 
served in school, which would otherwise be counted twice (as expenditures of private households and 
as public consumption). 
15   It is a major difference between NIPA and household budget surveys that the former includes 
employers’ contributions to health and pension insurance whereas it is excluded from private 
consumption in the latter (see Hertel/ Statistisches Bundesamt) 1997). 
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consumption is higher in Europe because governments provide individual services, not 
because ‘true’ collective consumption is higher in Europe. For collective consumption the 
USA looks like a typical European country. 
 
3.3 SERVICES IN THE COMPONENTS OF FINAL DEMAND 
Table 3.2 shows the development of the sector shares in final demand derived from the 
OECD Input-Output databases. Input-output data shows trade services as a separate 
category of final demand for other industries not as a separate industry providing to final 
demand (for definitions see Appendix 2 of the Gregory and Russo 2004). Thus the purchase 
price of a good from other industries is split into a component representing the actual good 
and another representing the distributional service. This is a major difference to expenditure 
data as published in the National Accounts or in expenditure surveys because in these data 
the service component is not separated but included in the expenditure for the good.
16 Final 
domestic demand data shows rising service shares up to 1990 for all DEMPATEM countries 
except Germany and the Netherlands (1986). These trends occur in current price (nominal) 
as well as in constant price (Table 3.2). The data for the mid 1990s (although not fully 
comparable to the earlier years) shows a continuation of these trends. Roughly speaking, the 
distance of the European countries with respect to the service-sector share in final demand 
to the USA remained at about 10%-points in the UK, France, and the Netherlands, but more 
in Germany. 
The causes for these differences in service shares of final demand may be related to different 
compositions of final demand. Exports, for example, consist mainly of manufactured goods 
and a high share of exports in final demand will therefore reduce the service share in overall 
final demand. By far the most important component of demand for services is private 
consumption, followed by public consumption, which together amount to 80 to 94 percent 
of total final demand for services (Table 3.3). Domestic consumption is also the most 
important final demand category for manufacturing, although in this sector it is much less 
dominant than for services. Therefore rising domestic demand will first of all benefit the 
service industries. The different final demand components have rather different weights in 
overall final demand in the various countries though. 
Looking at this issue from another perspective and asking what share the three broad 
sectors have within the final demand categories (Table 3.4) shows the dominance of services 
in the consumption categories (public and private). Especially in private household demand 
the service share rose substantially over time. The average American consumer spends three 
                                                  
16   Of course, the distributional service part is related to the purchase of a good. Trade is not a ‘stand 
alone’ service (see Glyn et al., 2004).  
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quarter of his or her overall expenditures on services. This share is generally lower in the 
European countries but it nevertheless still reaches 60%. The rise of the service share was, 
of course, at the expense of the relative demand for goods. 
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Table 3.2: The share of agriculture, manufacturing, and services in final domestic demand, current and 
constant prices 
     constant prices   current prices 
   Agriculture Manufacturing Services Agriculture  Manufacturing Services 
USA 1972  1.5  47.1  51.4  1.4  43.4  55.2 
  1977  1.9  44.1  54.0  1.8  43.2  55.0 
  1985  2.1  44.0  54.0  1.6  40.4  58.1 
  1990  1.9  42.5  55.6  1.4  37.7  60.9 
  1997        1.2  34.9  63.0 
UK 1968  3.4  56.3  40.3  3.6  53.0  43.4 
  1979  3.2  53.8  42.9  3.3  52.6  44.2 
  1984  4.2  48.6  47.1  4.8  47.0  48.2 
  1990  3.4  52.0  44.7  2.5  47.1  50.4 
  1995        1.6  40.4  57.9 
Germany 1972             
  1978  1.8  57.1  41.0  1.8  56.7  41.4 
  1986  1.3  56.7  41.6  1.2  55.5  42.8 
  1990  1.4  57.9  40.5  1.3  56.8  41.8 
  1995        1.4  47.2  51.4 
France 1972  3.4  54.1  42.5  4.7  61.5  33.8 
  1977  2.9  53.7  43.5  3.3  53.9  42.8 
  1985  3.7  49.8  46.5  3.5  49.3  47.2 
  1990  3.3  51.6  45.1  2.9  48.9  48.2 
  1995        1.6  44.7  53.7 
Netherlands 1972  3.6  53.1  43.2  3.4  55.0  41.5 
  1977  4.5  52.6  43.1  4.5  52.1  43.6 
  1986  4.3  52.6  43.0  4.6  51.5  44.1 
  1990             
  1995        3.8  47.9  49.0 
Spain 1972             
  1977             
 1986        3.5  45.9  50.6 
  1990        1.9  42.2  55.9 
  1995        2.5  42.8  54.7 
Base years for constant prices: US 1982, UK 1980, Germany 1985, France 1980, Netherlands 1980. 
Source: computations based on the OECD Input-Output database 
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Table 3.3: The weight of demand components in overall final demand (current) 
 Consumption  Investment  Exports  Imports 
 
Final 
Demand Overall  Private  Public   
Changes in 
stocks    
USA 1997           
Overall  100 72.8 59.6 13.2  17.9  0.5  8.8  9.5 
Agriculture 100  38.6  35.9  2.8  26.9  3.5  31.0  79.0 
Manufacturing 100  43.2  36.4  6.8 39.3  1.2  16.3  24.0 
Services  100 89.8 72.9 16.9  5.9  0.1  4.2  0.1 
UK   1995           
Overall  100 65.1 50.9 14.3  13.6  0.4 20.8 21.5 
Agriculture 100  42.3  42.3  0  7.6  0.2  49.9  66.8 
Manufacturing 100  38.6  38.6 0 28.1  0.9  32.4  41.4 
Services  100 84.3 59.7 24.6  3.7  0.1 11.8  6.4 
France 1995           
Overall  100 66.7 46.8 19.9  15.6  0.3 17.3 16.7 
Agriculture 100  58.3  58.3  0  5.1  2.2  34.3  82.2 
Manufacturing 100  40.3  39.1  1.3 28.0  0.6  31.0  31.0 
Services  100 88.9 52.9 36.0  5.7  0  5.3  2.9 
Germany 1995           
Overall  100  61 43.6 17.4  18.3  0.2 20.6 18.8 
Agriculture 100  65.3  65.1  0.2  12.3  0.8  21.6  122.8 
Manufacturing 100  29.7  29.6  0.1 33.2  0.4  36.7  31.9 
Services  100 89.5 55.8 33.7  4.8  0  5.7  3.9 
Netherlands 1995           
Overall 100  45.8  29.3  17  13.1  0.5  40.6  34.5 
Agriculture 100  9.1  9.1  0  4.6  -0.2  86.5  91.6 
Manufacturing 100  17.8  16.4  1.5 21.1  1.1  60  55.8 
Services  100  76 42.6 33.4  5.9  0  18  9.2 
Spain 1995           
Overall  100 65.7 50.1 15.6  18  0.3  16 19.2 
Agriculture 100  51.3  50.7  0.7  4 1  43.6  98 
Manufacturing 100  36.2  34.8  1.4 35.3  0.6  27.9  34.5 
Services  100 89.4 62.1 27.3  5.2  0  5.3  3.6 
Source: computations based on the OECD’s Input-Output database 
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Table 3.4: The distribution of final demand across agriculture, manufacturing and services (current 
prices) 
  Consumption Investment  Exports  Imports 
 
Final Demand 
Overall Private Public  
Changes in stocks 
  
USA 1997             
Agriculture 1.2  0.6  0.7  0.3  1.8 7.7  4.3  10.1 
Manufacturing 35.1  20.8  21.4  18.1  77.2  77.1  65.3  89.1 
Services 63.7  78.5  77.8  81.7  21  15.2  30.5  0.8 
UK   1995             
Agriculture 1.6  1.1  1.4  0  0.9 0.9  3.9  5.1 
Manufacturing 40.4  24  30.7  0  83.2  84.8  63.1  77.8 
Services 57.9  75  67.9  100  15.9  14.3  33  17.1 
France 1995             
Agriculture 1.6  1.4  2  0  0.5  11.5  3.2  7.9 
Manufacturing 44.7  27  37.3  2.8  79.8  83.1  80.2  82.8 
Services 53.7  71.6  60.7  97.2  19.6  5.3  16.6  9.3 
Germany 1995             
Agriculture 1.4  1.5  2.1  0  0.9 5.9  1.4  9 
Manufacturing 47.2  23  32.1  0.4  85.7  93.8  84.2  80.3 
Services 51.4  75.5  65.9  99.6  13.4  0.3  14.3  10.8 
Netherlands 1995             
Agriculture 3.9  0.8  1.2  0  1.3  -1.4  8.2  10.2 
Manufacturing 47.4  18.5  26.9  4.1  76.5  99  70.1  76.8 
Services 48.7  80.8  71.9  95.9  22.1  2.5  21.7  12.9 
Spain 1995             
Agriculture 2.5  2  2.5  0.1  0.6 8.8  6.8  12.8 
Manufacturing 42.8  23.6  29.7  3.9  83.7  90.6  74.9  77 
Services 54.7  74.5  67.8  96  15.8  0.7  18.3  10.2 




4 PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS’ DEMAND FOR SERVICES 
 
The aim of the study made by DEMPATEM’s private-consumption team (Adriaan Kalwij, 
Laura Blow, Marijke Deelen, François Gardes, Maria Jose Luengo-Prado, Stephen Machin, 
Javier Ruiz-Castillo, Wiemer Salverda, Ronald Schettkat and Christophe Starzec17) was to 
establish the role of the spending behaviour of private households for understanding the 
international differences in the broad structure of the economy, particularly with regard to 
the production of and demand for services. For this purpose we attempted to describe 
consumer demand patterns in an internationally uniform and consistent way and to explain 
the differences and changes in these patterns. For the latter the main issues were: 
 
(1) Household compositional effects. Differences and changes in households’ 
demographic composition and employment structure may affect the allocation of 
expenditures among the different commodities at the aggregate level. It is hypothesized that 
these changes caused an increase in the demand for services related commodities. 
 
(2) Income effects. Most developed countries have experienced real-income growth. The 
way the demand for a commodity is affected by household expenditures depends on 
whether this commodity is a luxury, a necessary or an inferior commodity. Under the 
assumption that services-related commodities are a luxury, their budget share will have 
increased over the last decades. On the income side inequality may also have an effect. 
When bottom-end incomes and wages lag behind, high-income households can afford to buy 
services more cheaply. 
 
(3) Price Effects. Baumol’s cost disease stipulates that certain sectors, such as the service 
sector, experience relatively lower productivity growth and, consequently, face relatively 
higher increasing costs (Baumol, 1967). This translates into relatively higher prices of the 
commodities produced in these sectors. Consequently, in the case demand is price-inelastic 
the budget shares of these commodities increase. The change in the budget share due to a 
change in relative prices holding quantities constant is referred to in this study as the Price 
effect.  
(4) Preference changes and substitution effects. Demand will most likely respond to 
relative price changes and preferences over commodities may have changed. These two 
                                                  
17   See Schmitt 2004, Blow 2004, Kalwij and Salverda 2004, Luengo-Prado and Ruiz-Castillo 2004, Deelen 
and Schettkat 2004, Gardes and Starzec 2004 and Kalwij and Machin 2004. 
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effects cannot be separately identified in this study and are considered unexplained or 
residual effects. 
 
For the study we have utilized the national microdata that are available from consumer 
household budget surveys for each of the six countries
18. We have gone to great length to 
treat the data in as comparable a fashion as possible between the countries – for spending 
patterns as well as household characteristics. Throughout the study we have distinguished 
between goods and services, and this has been a leading principle also for the categorization 
of commodities into a internationally comparable pattern. We believe that this effort of 
standardization is an important contribution to the literature. Existing studies do not provide 
sufficiently comparable data differed because of differences in definitions and methodology. 
In line with the rest of the project it was attempted to cover a longer period stretching 
preferably from no later than the end of the 1970s to the mid-1990s. The choice of years 
was determined by the availability of both the consumer budget surveys in the countries and 
data sources for other parts of the DEMPATEM project, particularly the input-output tables 
to be used for studying the structure of production.  
We summarize how that has been done in the first section. After this we describe the 
spending patterns and the composition of the household population by characteristics that 
resulted from the research. We discuss the international differences and similarities and the 
evolution over time. Finally, we present our approach to explaining the observed spending 
patterns from the individual household characteristics and the results that this generated. 
 
The material underlying this chapter can be found in separate reports for each of the six 
countries, an overview report summarizing these, and a methodological paper. Detailed 
results and explanations can be found there. 
 
4.1 DEMAND FOR SERVICES MADE COMPARABLE 
Most countries maintain a consumer budget survey but these surveys do not always serve 
the same purpose and they are certainly not internationally standardized in the way that, e.g., 
employment statistics are. Evidently, the fact that the goods and services that can be 
acquired for consumption by private households are largely similar across countries implies a 
certain degree of natural standardization. However, there is a whole series of important 
issues to which this not automatically applies and for which solutions had to be found. 
                                                  
18   Consumer Expenditure Survey for the USA, Family Expenditure Survey FES for the UK, Family Budget 
Survey for France, Einkommens- und Verbrauchstichprobe EVS for Germany, Encuestas de 
Presupuestos Familiares EPF for Spain and Consumentenbudgetonderzoek CBO for the Netherlands. 
Unfortunately, for Germany we had access only to a restricted set of microdata for 1993 and were 
forced to partly use tabulated data. 
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First, although the thousands of individual commodities may be a rather uniform set their 
statistical observation can differ. The observation of certain items that cost little is 
burdensome to the survey respondents and costly to the surveying institution. These are 
often treated differently, e.g., by keeping a diary for all such spending during a limited time 
period. During the research of DEMPATEM it turned out that the results of the American 
survey usually leave out all information of the so-called “diary portion”. This contrasts with 
other countries and we decided to include it – unfortunately, a lot of work for little 
difference. Second, in spite of the relative uniformity of the commodities that are observed 
their classification into more or less aggregate categories may differ, e.g. for holidays. For any 
feasible comparison we had to make do with such aggregations and make them as uniform as 
possible. We extensively discussed the properties of the classificatory scheme before 
adopting it. Third, the mode of provision to the consumer of particular commodities can 
vary essentially between countries ranging from exclusively private, i.e. via the market, at 
one extreme and exclusively public at the other extreme. Health care, education and similar 
services are non-trivial examples. Fourth, certain commodities cannot be observed directly 
by means of a individual survey although they are of economic import and part of the 
household spending relates to it. Imputed rent for owner-occupied housing is the important 
example here. This is not a piece of information a household could possibly supply as an 
answer to a direct question in a questionnaire. Therefore it is no surprise that the treatment 
of this issue varies strongly between surveys, from full imputation to total absence, e.g. in the 
case of the UK19. Fifth, the nature of goods and services may impose a certain structure on 
the spending side, as we just observed, but it has no effect on the standardization of 
household characteristics. We united on a detailed set of household characteristics to enable 
both a precise descriptive comparison and an identical explanatory approach. Another 
concern was the definition of household income, which may well hang together with the 
spending pattern. The in- or exclusion of housing-rent subsidies is a well-known example – if 
they exist they should be added to both sides, income as well as spending. Usually, income is 
underreported in these surveys as they are not targeted to measuring this accurately. 
Consequently, we could not use money incomes for explanation nor could we study savings 
behaviour. As an alternative we used total expenditures and will talk about budget effects 
instead of income effects. 
In addition to this, some more general properties of the surveys were important. For an 
adequate explanation of spending from household behaviour the spending on durable goods 
is a problematic issue. The frequency of such spending is low with many observations of zero 
spending as a consequence in an annual survey. 
                                                  
19   Compare Frick and Grabka, 2003, which we came to know only at the end of the project. 
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All this has led us to a two-step approach. First, we determined uniform totals of spending. 
This included the health and education, durables and imputed rent. Together with a 
breakdown by spending categories this has been used for an in-depth descriptive 
comparison, with some astonishing results especially with regard to housing. The second 
step concerned the effort to explain the patterns of spending from household 
characteristics. Here we limited ourselves to what we have called the ‘restricted’ 
DEMPATEM categories. These notably exclude the commodity categories that can involve 
public provision: health care and education, but also housing spending was excluded as the 
imputation process involved the use of the same household characteristics that should be 
used for the explanation. Finally, durables were excluded. 
 
4.2 THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
As we just said the survey data had to be made compatible for the international comparison 
in two respects: the characteristics of the consumer households and the categorization of 
commodities into a spending pattern from which budget shares could be determined. We 
start considering the former. 
To keep the descriptive effort manageable the number of household characteristics had to 
be strictly limited and to make it meaningful the nature of the characteristics had to extend 
beyond pure demographics and include employment. Employment participation differs 
substantially between the USA and the European countries and this could potentially affect 
the spending pattern as suggested by e.g. the ‘marketization hypothesis’
20. 
All statistics reported below are weighted sample statistics providing a representative 
picture of the national population. 
 
Households 
On the demographic side we distinguished 17 categories. We report here about singles, 
single parents, couples with and without children, the retired (defined as having a head of 
household aged over 64) and other households such as those with a parent or another 
relative of the head of the household. The latter group was sizeable in Spain and France but 
it was also important in the USA in 1997. Compositional differences between the countries 
and the years are considerable (Figure 4.1).  
We found a decrease in average household size in all countries, the Netherlands now having 
the smallest average size or, inversely, the highest number of households per head of the 
population. Behind this decrease was both a declining number of children in households but 
                                                  
20   Freeman and Schettkat, xx 
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also – except for Spain – an increase in the share of singles which inflates the number of 
households. Transatlantic differences were small, albeit the growth of singles was more 
limited in the USA. It was very strong in the Netherlands, France and the UK, and 
complementary to this the share of couples with children declined substantially – the 
‘traditional’ type of the single-earner households bore the brunt of these developments. The 
share of couples without children stagnated and surprisingly fell somewhat in the USA. 
Retired shares are relatively high in Germany and the UK. 
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The involvement of households in paid employment was also investigated. Joblessness 
appears to be rather high, though unchanged since the end of the 1970s, in the Netherlands 
(18%), followed by the UK (14%) and France (13%). American joblessness is much lower at 
between 4 and 5 per cent of all households. In the 1990s the share of singles
21 in the USA is 
not much different from Europe, but they have a substantially higher level of employment 
participation (see Table 4.1). This ranges from 60 per cent in Spain and the Netherlands to 
almost 90 in the USA. For couples with or without children the USA is not performing 
better. This group’s share in the population in the USA is one of the lowest and their 
employment-participation rate, although the highest, is not much higher than in Europe. 
Strikingly, the share of couples with children and two jobs declined in all countries except 
                                                  
21   Singles as well as couples are taken here with or without children. 
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Spain and the Netherlands. Their share is low in Germany and the Netherlands and high in 
the UK and the USA. 
 




























Singles  22 25 22 29 14 24 12 19  7  9 15 28 
Couples  52 43 48 41 55 48 51 41 61 59 63 52 
  Two-earners 
     with children  22  19  10  8  24  20  19  16  15  19  7  12 
Employment participation rates 
single  86 88 65 74 69 60 69 59 62 59 43 61 
couple  97 97 92 92 95 91 95 87 90 88 85 86 
 
We conclude that with regard to households Europe and the USA shared a number of 
trends: the declines in the average size and in the shares of couples and of two-earner 
households with children and, in the opposite direction, the increase in the share of singles 
and singles in employment. With this Europe moved closer to the American pattern, 
particularly for household composition. The average absolute difference in percentage shares 
of the six demographic categories decreased very little for Spain but substantially for the 
other countries. At the same time level differences can still be substantial. Consequently, it 
seems worth the effort to investigate the effects of household characteristics on the national 
patterns of consumer spending. 
 
Expenditures 
For arranging the commodities from the available data we have designed a list of categories 
reflecting common views on spending patterns and geared to the distinction between goods 
and services at the same time. This resulted in 20 categories covering all spending, what we 
have called the ‘complete’ pattern.  
As was stated before, for the purpose of an internationally comparable analytical approach 
we then removed the categories for which it seemed dubious that consumer household 
survey data would provide adequate information on spending for all countries. This 
concerned education, health care and housing. At the same time we took out durable 
spending from all remaining categories. This led to what we termed the ‘restricted’ pattern, 
which then comprised non-durable market goods and services. Table 4.2 presents an 
overview of the categories and the restrictions. Twenty categories were needed for a 
proper insight into the ‘building blocks’ of goods and services. The first eight categories 
comprise goods and the last twelve services.  
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Table 4.2 The categorization of commodities 
Complete categorization  Excluded from the restricted domain 
 1. Food and non-alcoholic beverages    
 2. Alcoholic beverages and tobacco   
 3. Clothing and footwear   
 4. Private transport goods   
 5. Furnishing and appliances   
 6. Entertainment goods   
 7. Personal Goods   






















GOODS    
    
 9. Food and beverages away from home    
10. Holiday Services     
11. Housing  x because of imputations   
12. Household services    
13. Health goods and services  x because of public/private provision   
14. Personal services    
15. Public transport services     
16. Private transport services    
17. Communication services     
18. Education and training services  x because of public/private provision   
19. Entertainment services    
20. Miscellaneous services    
SERVICES    
 
Figure 4.2 shows the quantitative effects of the restrictions at the aggregate level. A number 
of highly interesting conclusions can be drawn on the four excluded types of expenditures. 
As was said before we spent much effort on making the spending on housing internationally 
comparable, including imputed rent either as it was found in the survey or by imputing it 
ourselves as best as we could. The imputing techniques necessarily differed and housing 
expenditures are not perfectly comparable across countries. 
The effects are highly interesting. Housing appears to be a very substantial category of 
expenditures, taking up to nearly 30 per cent of the total household budgets. Housing 
expenditures also showed substantial increases in most countries, ranging from 3 or 4 
percentage-points in France, Germany and Spain to 10 in the UK. The American outcomes 
are within the range found in Europe. The importance of these observations resides in the 
fact that much of the spending on housing, certainly in the National Accounts statistics 
(which also impute rent), is commonly considered as a part of services. Apparently, large 
part of the increase in aggregate spending on services does not rest on hard observations of 
transactions but on a constructed variable. 
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Second, we find that direct spending from the household purse on the two mixed 
public/private categories of health and education is relatively small and also not very different 
between the USA and Europe. It is a far cry from the spending on both as it appears in the 
national statistics (which naturally includes the public financing that is not captured in surveys 
of private spending). Third, we see that spending on durables although certainly not 
negligible is relatively limited. It seems somewhat larger in France and Germany, but again 
the USA is not out of range. Naturally, given the definition above that one cannot drop 
services on one’s feet they can most certainly also not be stored and kept for future use, and 
therefore taking out durables implies a shrinking of the goods categories solely. 
 
It is important to note that, taken together, the excluded categories take up a rather 
substantial and increasing amount of all consumer spending. Consequently, the ‘restricted’ 
spending that we will focus on below, varies between 55 and 65 per cent at the end of the 
1990s with the exception of Spain where it amounted to 70. The role of the day-to-day 
provision of market goods and services in consumer life may be more limited than many 
would think, nevertheless a substantial majority of expenditures is still covered. Naturally, 
this observation also serves as a caveat for what follows. Our explanation of spending from 
household characteristics goes as far as this. It cannot provide the full picture of consumer 
expenditures in the national economy. The justification is that we did not think that the 
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spending beyond the restrictions could be explained with sufficient scientific rigour from 
individual household behaviour in a cross-country comparison. 
 
























































Within the restricted domain there are 17 remaining categories of spending, which are all 
considered in the explanatory analysis to which we turn in section 4.3. For the present 
descriptive presentation we first focus on the distinction between goods and services. Figure 
4.3 depicts the shares of both in the total of restricted expenditures. 
 
We see that in all countries services have a minority share but also that the share increased 
substantially over the two decades that we covered. The detailed country studies showed 
that the goods share decreased primarily because expenditures on food and beverages fell, 
including alcoholic beverages and tobacco – except for France where the latter remained 
constant. For the other six goods categories the picture is mixed, with some increase or 
some decrease and some differences between the countries. Spending on private transport 
goods fell noticeably in the USA – but we note again that durable goods such as cars were 
excluded – and clothing and footwear did in several countries. 
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On the side of services the changes fanned out more widely. Many categories witnessed an 
increasing share, actually in the USA all categories did. Also there was more uniformity 
between the countries. However, there are some interesting exceptions to this pattern. 
Spending on household services fell in the Spain, Germany and France, as did private 
transport services in the USA and France. By contrast, spending in restaurants, ‘food and 
beverages away from home’, registered substantial growth in some countries but a clear fall 
in Germany and very little growth in the USA. Personal services is a third categories for 
which wages may be an important cost. The evolution of the three categories is shown in 
Figure 4.4. Their combined share is clearly smaller in Germany. 
The American share is close to the British and the Dutch while the French and Spanish 
shares are significantly higher, mainly because of higher spending in restaurants. 
 
We also studied the development of prices as an input for the further analysis, as much as 
possible at the level of the 20 commodity categories. Table 4.3 summarizes the results.  
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Table 4.3  Average annual changes of relative prices 














All  Goods  and  Services  5.7 4.0 7.4 8.5  13.9 2.8 
Within All Goods and Services (compared to the overall total) 
Durable Goods  -1.2  0.0  -1.6 -1.6 -2.0 -0.6 
Health  Services  3.6 0.1 2.3  -1.4  -1.1 0.1 
Education  Services  5.7  -0.9 4.3 2.0 0.1 0.7 
Housing  -0.1 0.1 2.5 1.3 0.8 2.0 
Restricted  Expenditures  -0.2  0.0 -0.2 -0.2  0.1 -0.6 
Within Restricted Expenditures  (compared to the restricted total) 
Non Durable Goods  -0.6  0.0 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 
Services  1.0 0.1 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.6 
 
Durable goods have become relatively cheaper in all countries except Germany. Prices of 
health and education have in particular increased in the USA and the UK. The price of 
housing sharply increased in the Netherlands, France and the UK and decreased somewhat 
in the USA. Non-durable goods and services have become relatively cheaper while services 
became more expensive over time and, consequently, goods became relatively cheaper. This 
observation is in line with Baumol’s cost disease applied to the labour-intensive service 
sector that experiences lower productivity gains than goods industries. 
 
We conclude this section by taking a look at real average household expenditures, both for 
complete and restricted spending, for the total and at three different points in the household 
distribution of spending levels to indicate changes in inequality. Note that no adaptation was 
made for household size and composition, in other words these amounts have not been 
equivalised over households. Figure 4.5 shows the annual growth rates. 
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Figure 4.5  Annual growth (%) of average household expenditures, complete and restricted, and for 
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The aggregate growth of complete spending appears to be small in the USA, France and the 
Netherlands, and relatively large (about 2 %) in the UK and Spain, which is consistent with 
other sources. The change is also shown for three decile levels of the distribution of 
complete expenditures: the first, fifth and ninth decile. In all countries, notably including the 
USA., the increase was larger at the bottom of the distribution than higher up, with the slight 
exception of the Netherlands. The last bar shows the evolution of the average restricted 
expenditures per household. It should be noted that the USA registered a decline. This 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the sign of findings below. 
 
4.3 EXPLAINING CHANGES IN DEMAND 
As the last part of this chapter on consumer demand, we discuss the possible explanations 
for the changes in the expenditure patterns that have been observed, particularly for the 
demand for services. The possible explanations are: 
•  Composition effects: changes in household composition: here we distinguish 
between demographic changes and changes in household employment. 
•  Budget effects: change in household expenditures here we distinguish between 
changes in the average budget and changes in expenditures inequality. 
•  Price effects: the increase in the budget share due to an increase in the relative price 
of this commodity, ignoring substitution effects. 
•  Price substitution effects and preferences changes over time. (residual) 
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A uniform system of (reduced-form) Engel curves was used for estimating the relationship 
between each of the budget shares for each of the 17 commodity categories on the one 
hand and 7 household demographic variables, 3 employment variables
22 and total 
expenditures on the other hand. The latter represents income, which could not be used 
because it is poorly measured in some of the countries. The estimates were used for 
decomposing the change with respect to the household characteristics. Table 4.4 presents 
the results of this analysis, summarizing it for the two broad categories of (non-durable) 
good and services. The size of the shift from goods to services over the period was between 
7 and 9 percentage-points except for the Netherlands where it was close to 14. 
Demographic changes, i.e. household composition, explained only a limited part of the 
changes in the spending pattern in each of the countries, 10 – 20 per cent. In addition, 
changes in household employment appeared to explain very little indeed. This is an amazing 
finding given the changes in employment participation. We expected to find substantial 
effects of increased female employment participation leading to growing numbers of two-
earner households. One possible explanation for the absence of such effects may be sought 
in the nature of the compositional change among households. The share of two-earner 
households tended to decline and much of the increase was among singles for whom 
employment participation may make little difference for the spending pattern. Also, the 
possible changes may not affect the goods-services division. Two-earner households may buy 
another car before going to a restaurant or hiring domestic services. Finally, the effect to be 
considered next, budget levels, may have eaten away the effect of increased employment. 
                                                  
22   Logarithm of household size, the number of persons under 6 years, number of persons over 5 and 
under 18 years of age, over 17 and under 31 years, over 30 and under 65 years, and over 64 years of 
age, each time divided by household size; age and age squared of the head of household; the number of 
employed persons in the household, a dummy variable equal to 1 if all adults are employed, 0 
otherwise, and, finally, a dummy variable equal to 1 if all adults are employed and a person under 6 
years of age is present in the household, 0 otherwise. For several countries a regional variables were 
also included. 
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ES  1980-1990        
Goods -7.0  -1.0  0.1  -3.0 0.0  -1.9  -1.2 
Services  7.0 1.0  -0.1 3.0  0.0  1.9  1.2 
NL  1979-1998        
Goods -13.6  -2.6  -0.1  -0.9 0.6  -2.9  -7.7 
Services  13.6 2.6 0.1 0.9  -0.6  2.9  7.7 
US  1980-1997        
Goods -8.3  -0.8  0.1  0.9 0.0  -3.2  -5.1 
Services 8.3  0.8  -0.1  -0.9 0.0  3.2  5.1 
FR  1980-1995        
Goods  -8.0 -1.1  0.2 -2.6  0.0  -5.2  0.7 
Services  8.0 1.1  -0.2 2.6  0.0  5.2  -0.7 
UK  1980-1998        
Goods -9.2  -1.6  -0.1 -2.8  0.5  -6.3  1.1 
Services  9.2 1.6 0.1 2.8  -0.5  6.3  -1.1 
DE  1978-1993        
Goods -8.4  -1.5  0.0  -1.4 0.0  -4.6  -0.8 
Services  8.4 1.5 0.0 1.4  0.0  4.6  0.9 
 
The level of total expenditures – the third issue – will impact the budget shares depending 
on the budget elasticity. These can be found, again for the goods and services aggregates 
only, in Table 4.5. The table shows that the aggregate of services is a luxury. Hence one 
would expect the share of services to be increasing with the level of spending. Indeed, the 
budget level effects can explain between 40 per cent of the services increase for Spain and a 
few per cent for the Netherlands. The USA had a negative outcome which indicates that the 
share of services grew in spite of the decline in average household spending in the restricted 
domain that was noted above. The explanatory role of income inequality was investigated 
with the help of the Theil index again based on budgets. The index appeared to show very 
little movement over time and was significantly different from the USA only for the 
Netherlands. Greater inequality may imply that high-income households can command more 
low-paid services. The contribution of inequality to the explanation is next to nothing. A 
greater or lesser inequality between households had no noticeable effects on the pattern of 
consumption. 
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Table 4.5  Budget elasticities, restricted expenditures 
Country US  DE  UK  FR  ES  NL 
Year  1980 1978 1980 1995 1980 1979 
Non  Durable  Goods  0.80 0.75 0.77 0.97 0.82 0.80 
Services  1.38 1.45 1.66 1.08 1.70 1.61 
 
Price effects support the notion of a more rapid increase in the price of services compared 
to goods, likely because of differential developments in productivity in line with Baumol’s 
cost disease. They appeared to be rather large in our findings. In the UK prices explained 
almost two-thirds of the 9 percentage-point increase in spending on services. There were 
also major effects for France and Germany. For the three other countries, however, the 
effects were more limited – less than one-third in Spain and the Netherlands and somewhat 
more in the USA. Baumol’s virus does not affect countries equally. 
Finally, the residual of the estimation is attributed to changes in preferences of the 
households and substitution between categories. Its role for the explanation is very limited 
with the exception of the USA and the Netherlands. 
We conclude from this that changes in consistently defined consumption patterns seem to 
have more to do with rising expenditures and shifts in relative prices as well as in 
preferences than they do with the changing composition of households across countries. 
The American patterns do not seem to deviate significantly from the European. We also 
note that the aggregate behaviour of services and goods does not imply that all individual 
categories comprised within both aggregates necessarily move in the same direction. 
Particular goods can have high budget elasticities and particular services can have low 
elasticities. This is consistent with findings in the other parts of the research project, the 
structure of production and employment. The role of level effects was also found elsewhere. 
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5 THE INTER-INDUSTRY DIVISION OF LABOUR 
 
5.1 VERTICALLY INTEGRATED SECTORS 
Modern economies are extremely complex and almost all products are composite products. 
The provision of services, say the booking of a flight, requires inputs of manufactured goods 
and of other services. Computers need to be activated, databanks need to be contacted and 
so forth. Thus, the productivity in the provision of a specific service does not only depend 
on the face-to-face provision of the service but also on the productivity of the various inputs 
used – it depends on the productivity of the whole supply chain. Even if the face-to-face 
provision of a service suffers from technological stagnancy, improvements in the supply chain 
at earlier stages of the production process may raise the productivity of this service. Baumol 
(2001) used the example of a string quartet, which itself cannot improve its productivity 
when giving a concert but their travel time to the concert halls all over the world may 
shorten substantially. However, the productivity improvements in the supply chain may also 
be limited, which led Baumol to classify some services as ‘asymptotically stagnant’. 
Thus, to determine the productivity of a certain service requires aggregation over all steps of 
production necessary to produce this final service. Also the answer the question on the 
difference in labour intensity between goods and services requires the aggregation of labour 
inputs in the production chain. The production process needs to be vertically integrated 
(Pasinetti 1973) to achieve the full picture of productivity and/or labour intensity. Input-
output analysis does exactly this, analysing the linkages from final demand to employment 
through the production structure. Input-output analysis allows tackling questions on the 
relative employment intensity of final demand for services and goods. Does service demand 
create more jobs than the demand for goods? Where are these jobs created? How do 
changes in final demand patterns affect employment? Does the change in product mix of final 
demand promote or discourage employment? Is the US product mix of final demand more 
employment friendly than that in Europe? 
 
5.2 EMPLOYMENT CREATION OF FINAL PRODUCT DEMAND 
When integrating over the production chain, does the common assertion hold that service 
demand creates more jobs than the demand for goods? To analyze this question the 
DEMPATEM input-output team (Mary Gregory and Giovanni Russo23) performed a series of 
simulations varying product-specific final demand by standardized amounts within each 
country. For example, in the USA final demand was first raised for manufacturing products 
by 1 million 1997 US dollars, then for transport etc. producing comparable employment 
                                                  
23   For more detail see Gregory and Russo 2004. 
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effects of additional spending across products and years. Table 5.1 summarizes the results, 
which are comparable within the countries. 
 
Table 5.1: Employment Creation of a Standardized Increase in Final Demand for Various Products, 
Industry (Manufacturing, Utilities, Construction) =100 
  USA UK  France 
  1977 1997 1977 1997 1977 1997 
Industry    1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Agriculture  1.0 1.5 0.5 1.7 1.2 2.4 
Manufacturing  0.8 1.1 0.3 1.0 1.1 1.3 
Utilities  0.2 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Construction  0.4 1.1 0.4 1.2 0.6 1.3 
Services  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.4 
    Trade  0.8 1.5 0.3 1.2 0.6 1.6 
    Hotels,  Restaurants  0.3 0.6 0.3 1.1 0.3 1.3 
    Transport  0.5 1.0 0.2 0.9 0.6 1.4 
    Communication  0.5 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.2 
    Finance,  insurance  0.3 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.8 
  Real estate  0.2  0.7  0.3  0.8  .  . 
    Community,  social  services  0.4 1.5 0.3 1.4 1.4 2.1 
  Germany Netherlands  Spain 
  1977 1997 1977 1997 1977 1997 
Industry    1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Agriculture  2.1 2.0 0.4 1.6 2.5 2.0 
Manufacturing  0.3 1.1 4.7 2.0 0.8 1.3 
Utilities  0.4 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.7 
Construction  0.8 1.2 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.3 
Services  1.1 1.2 0.9 1.4 1.2 0.9 
    Trade  0.9 1.5 0.5 1.4 1.2 1.3 
    Hotels,  Restaurants  0.7 2.1 0.5 1.7 1.4 1.3 
    Transport  0.9 1.3 0.4 1.5 1.2 0.7 
    Communication  1.1 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.8 0.7 
    Finance,  insurance  0.5 0.8 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.7 
    Real  estate  0.3 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.7 
    Community,  social  services  1.2 1.5 0.5 1.9 2.4 1.3 
Source: based on Gregory and Russo 2004 
 
First of all the table reveals that the employment creation of services is not generally higher 
than that of manufacturing goods. But there is country variation. Especially France and 
Germany seem to create more jobs in services than in ‘industry’ but the French/German 
picture does not hold uniformly for Europe.24 Over time, it seems that the employment 
effects a standardized unit of final demand creates in service has risen relative to the 
employment effects it has in manufacturing. 
Within the countries it seems to be roughly the same industries that create more jobs per 
unit of standardized final demand in the late 1970s and the 1990s. The rank correlations of 
                                                  
24   There is huge variation within the manufacturing sector and some industries like ‘manufacturing of 
office machinery’ show very high employment effects whereas ‘chemicals’ or ‘pharmaceuticals’ show 
only very modest effects. 
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the employment effects are around 0.7 for the years 1977 and 1997 (1995 respectively). 
Across countries the correlations are even higher between the European countries but 
lower between the European countries and the USA., especially for France and Germany 
(compare Gregory and Russo 2004, Table X1). 
 
When demand increases, manufacturing industries keep between 50% (in the US) and 59% (in 
the Netherlands) of the employment change within that industry, between 24% (Germany) and 
31% (US) spills over to services and the rest is employment created in other manufacturing 
industries.  For services the retained percentages are much higher. Between 71% (in the US) and 
78% (in Germany) remain within the service industry and only between 6% (France) and 11% 
(Spain) spill over to manufacturing industries (see Figure 5.1). Over time these patterns look 
fairly stable, except for Spain, where outsourcing from manufacturing to services increased 
substantially. It is remarkable that the employment effects of outsourcing from manufacturing 
differ from the value-added shares actually outsourced from manufacturing to employment, 
which are higher in Europe than in the USA indicating a different mix of intermediate services on 
both sides of the Atlantic or that value added per person in US intermediate services is lower 
than in Europe (Russo and Schettkat 2001). 
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Source: based on Gregory and Russo, 2004 
48  
5.3 COUNTERFACTUALS: WHAT CAUSES THE US-EUROPE 
DIFFERENCE IN SERVICE-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT? 
Is the European product-demand structure employment unfriendly? Could Europe improve 
employment levels if it had the American product-demand structure? There seems to be an 
implicit agreement among many economists and politicians that these questions need to be 
answered with a clear YES. However, the DEMPATEM analysis concludes with a clear NO. 
The final-demand mix within services European-style creates more employment than the 
final-demand structure within services in the USA in the order of 3 to 7%. This result holds 
both ways, when the production structure of the USA and that of the European countries is 
applied. The European mix of final service demand seems to be more employment friendly 
than the American mix. However, the overall higher share of services – not the structure 
within final service demand – in the USA clearly improves employment although on very 
modest rates not compensating the negative effects of the service mix.  
 
When restricting the analysis to private household consumption, the pattern reverses. Now 
the American service mix and the share have clearly employment-enhancing effects in the 
European countries. Since investment has only a small share in the final demand for services, 
the public sector must cause the extreme differences between the employment effects of US 
service demand patterns in overall final demand compared to private household demand. 
However, compared to the employment effects of differences in demand levels, the 
employment effects of the demand structure are marginal. 
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6 WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY, DEMAND AND THE EMPLOYMENT 
GAP 
 
Even if consumption patterns (Chapter 4) and production structures (Chapter 5) were the 
identical across countries employment patterns might differ because of diverging productivity 
levels, leading to less or more jobs for producing the same output. In an economic context 
such productivity differences would have to rest on differences in wage costs. Such 
differences could exist because of different supply and demand conditions in the labour 
market and/or different institutions regulating these markets. Clearly, such differences do 
exist, as we have learned from the preceding chapters, and all the more there is good reason 
to investigate what wages and productivity may contribute to the understanding of the 
employment gap – which is the aim of the present chapter. It is based on the work done by 
Andrew Glyn, Joachim Moeller, John Schmitt, Michel Sollogoub and Wiemer Salverda (Glyn 
et al. 2004). 
 
The focus in this chapter on the sector of distribution services. This is based on the 
following considerations. 
 
(i)  Distribution services is a major contributor to the gap between European and 
USA employment rates. 
(ii)  Distribution is the major services sector most clearly related to household 
consumption. Community and personal services are differentially supplied by the 
market and state sectors across countries, which makes it extremely difficult to 
analyze in a comparative framework. Distribution services is a purely private 
sector and thus reflects market pressures more directly. 
(iii)  Distribution services is the most important site of low-skill employment. If 
European rigidities inhibit the employment at the lower end of the labour 
market then distribution should exemplify this problem. The OECD (2001, table 
3.8) has shown that more than one half of the employment gap between the EU 
and USA for low-wage jobs (lowest third of the US wage distribution) was 
located in distribution services and this accounted for over one quarter of the 
total jobs deficit. 
(iv)  It is possible – as we will see – to make plausible attempts at measuring both 
productivity growth in distribution services over time within an economy and, a 
much more difficult task, productivity levels across countries. This is important 
for understanding employment differences. 
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This chapter first describes pay and employment in the retail sector and reports on a 
detailed econometric analysis of national data covering pay and employee characteristics. 
The object is to pin down the extent to which these employment and pay patterns are 
consistent with the notion that employment in this sector in Europe is substantially 
constrained by labour market rigidities. Next, the analysis widens to compare productivity 
and capital accumulation in distribution services in the USA and our group of European 
economies to verify whether these patterns support the rapid wage increase/capital 
intensification/fast productivity growth/low employment growth picture of European 
services. Thirdly we examine the role of the lower levels and/or slower growth of 
consumption demand in limiting employment in distribution services in Europe as compared 
to the USA. 
 
6.1 EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE STRUCTURE 
If an industry were severely inhibited by labour market rigidities in Europe we would 
anticipate that it would be paying wages which were on average much closer to those in the 
rest of the economy than in the USA. This would be because higher relative wages for the 
unskilled in general would push up wage costs in this low-skill sector. Further, minimum 
wages or welfare state floors would prevent employers in this sector taking advantage of 
slack labour markets at the bottom end of the pay scale to further economize on wage costs 
by paying below the going rate for given skill categories (a wage “penalty” for working in 
retail). Wage compression would also lead to “employment structure compression” – less 
opportunity for retail to take advantage of low pay for certain groups (youth for example) 
who may be quite suitable for work in that sector. 
To approach this we have compared the patterns of employment and wages for the USA and 
four of our European countries using microdata sets25 that allowed to go back to the end of 
the 1970s. Distribution services comprises wholesale trade, retail trade, and hotels and 
catering. To focus as sharply as possible on the segment of the labour market where the 
impact of rigidities should be most apparent wholesale is left out of the detailed analysis, if 
data allow. Combining the microdata evidence with the above LFS data the employment rate 
for retail was estimated. European employment in retail was relatively steady whereas it 
continued to expand in the USA. Thus the employment gap in retail, already considerable at 
                                                  
25   The data sets are: Current Population Survey (CPS), Beschäftigtenstichprobe IAB, Enquête Emploi (EE), 
General Household Survey( GHS), Loonstructuuronderzoek (LSO).It has proved impossible to carry 
out a comparable analysis of Spain due to limitations in the available data. These microdata sets are 
either establishment based (Germany, Netherlands) or household based and the variables (measures of 
wages for example) are not always exactly comparable across countries as we note below. The 
German data consistently concern West Germany and exclude the public sector. 
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the end of the 1970s, grew over the period from 1.3 to 1.7 percentage-points of the 
population (Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.2  Employment rates for employees only in retail, selected years* 
Ratios to population of working age 
 EU4  USA  USA-EU4 
end of 1970s  4.5  5.8  1.3 
end of 1980s  4.6  6.1  1.5 
mid of 1990s  4.5  6.2  1.7 
*) End of 1970s: UK, US, NL 1979, Germany 1978, France 1982; end of 1980s UK, US 1990, NL and Germany 1989, 
France 1991; mid of 1990s: France and Germany 1995, NL 1996, US 1997 and UK 1998. 
 
Table 6.2 shows how employment in retail in each country differs in composition – gender, 
age, part-time working and skill levels – from the national average.  
As a broad generalisation, the specific characteristics of retail employment tend to be more 
constant over time within countries than equal between countries. In terms of age and 
gender composition of employment in US retailing does not seem to be an extreme case. 
When it comes to skills, however, there is a striking difference26. In the USA (together with 
the UK and Netherlands) the least skilled are over-represented in retail, but in Germany and 
France there is a smaller proportion of the least qualified than in the economy as a whole. 
This seems consistent with the notion that regulation was increasingly holding back the 
employment of the low skilled in this industry which internationally appears as archetypically 
low skilled. 
                                                  
26   The three skill levels are measured using the: ISCED levels 0-2, 4 and 5-7. Skills are notoriously difficult 
to compare across countries since the educational systems from which they are derived differ so 
widely; however these problems are less worrying for the comparisons of retail to the national average. 
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Table 6.2  Employment characteristics in retail, selected years 
% of average for the economy, dependent employment, full-time equivalents* 













<1/3 avg  wage 
low 
skilled 
US 1979  106  158  210  105  114  50  80 160  84 
 1990  107  178  197  113  118  49  74 167  83 
 1997  105  178  180  117  118  54  76 162  90 
DE-W 1978  183  146  237  67  120  27  74 167  74 
 1990  184  136  223  65  118  27  77 157  81 
 1995  174  135  206  69  116  28  79 152  83 
FR 1982  113  177  120  94  120  32  81 187  94 
 1991  117  200  129  82  125  34  80 159  94 
 1995  113  215  117  74  124  42  78 183  97 
UK 1979  not  available 
 1990  151  164  177  130  115  24  65 n.a.  76 
 1998  138  200  178  124  130  42  62 n.a.  74 
NL 1979  124  186  223  128  66  9  73 216  79 
 1985  147  213  183  134  102  13  71 210  75 
 1996  143  241  164  130  119  28  70 204  78 
*) FTE and hourly wages, except Germany: head count and monthly wage (median instead of average). No correction for 
hours worked was possible; consequently average wages in German retail may be underestimated in comparison with the 
average. 
Sources: Current Population Survey (CPS), Beschäftigtenstichprobe, Enquête Emploi (EE), General Household Survey( GHS), 
Loonstructuuronderzoek (LSO) 
 
The right-hand panel of Table 6.2 presents a similar analysis of the comparative position of 
retail for some key dimensions of the wage structure. The simplest comparison – average 
wages – gives the most striking result. Here there seems remarkable uniformity across our 
five countries – workers in retailing are on average paid around two-thirds to three quarters 
of the national average and these ratios are rather stable across time. This seems 
inconsistent with the over-regulation/wage-compression view of Europe, since in such labour 
markets employers should have less opportunity to pay below the national average. For a 
number of countries the retail wage at the first decile is a considerably higher ratio to the 
national D1 wage than is the case for average wages (not shown). This would seem to 
suggest an effective wages floor even in retail and so it is not surprising to find France in this 
position. However this was not true for Germany and the USA more closely resembles 
France here. The column for the concentration of workers in the sector who are the 
bottom third of the overall pay distribution seems to show France with a greater 
concentration in retailing than does the USA. The right-most column focuses on the low 
skilled in retailing. The worst paid amongst the low skilled were no worse off in retail than 
they were elsewhere in USA and France, but appear to have been far worse off in retail in 
Germany and the UK27. 
                                                  
27   The fact that the German pay data is monthly and does not include hours worked limits the value of 
the comparisons involving Germany as it must exaggerate the width of the distribution as numbers of 
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The picture of retailing employment derived from this analysis is far from straightforward. In 
some respects it fits well with the regulation/wage compression story but the pattern overall 
hardly meshes in with this. To try and get behind this rather bewildering pattern we turn to 
a more detailed analysis of differences in employment and wage structure estimating the 
wage structure of retail trade relative to the rest of the economy in three successively more 
complex ways. 
 
The first set of estimates involves a standard wage equation covering all sectors. The results 
are built up from an initial estimation involving simply a dummy for retail (and another for 
hotels and catering not reported here) which gives the “raw” industry wage differential. The 
addition of successive groups of controls (gender, youth, experience, skills and part-time 
work) whittle away at the industry differential because retail employs more of the low-wage 
categories. The result is an estimate of the retail pay penalty – the average extent to which 
an individual working in retail is earning less than somebody with the same characteristics 
working elsewhere. Figure 6.1 shows that the pure wage penalty for working in retail is 
substantial and does not differ much between the countries or over time. There are also 
substantial composition effects on the wage bill, to which we return, below. The fundamental 
point from this simple exercise is that the USA (or indeed the UK whose new-found labour 
market flexibility is widely trumpeted) do not appear as clear outliers in retail pay as 
compared to the continental European countries. 
                                                                                                                                         
the worst paid also work shorter hours. This problem can be sidestepped more effectively in the 
regression analysis which follows 
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These estimates followed the usual route of regression about the mean. However the lack of 
labour market flexibility is supposed to bolster wages, and thus discourage employment, 
particularly at the bottom end of the wage distribution. Quantile regressions allow an 
assessment of whether the impact on pay of particular factors, such as industry, vary at 
different points in the relevant distribution (in this case deciles of the pay distribution). 
Accordingly a broadly similar wage equation to that used above was re-estimated using 
quantile methods, at the second (D2), fifth (D5) and eighth (D8) deciles. If retailers were 
really able to take advantage of greater flexibility at the bottom end of the pay scale in the 
USA to pay very low wages it would be anticipated that the “retail penalty” would be greater 
at D2 in the USA than in Europe even if the average penalty over the distribution was 
similar. 
 
Table 6.3 presents the pay penalties for retail industry that remain after controlling for 
worker characteristics. Two features of the American results are striking. Firstly the pay 
penalties are consistently smaller at the bottom of the pay distribution (D2) than they are 
higher up. In this respect the USA is not dissimilar to the other countries where penalties 
increase the higher is the point in the distribution. Secondly the size of the pay penalties in 




Table 6.3  Pay penalties (%) of retailing by level in the wage distribution 
  USA    DE-W    UK   
  1979 1990 1997 1979 1990 1997  1989/90  1998/01 
D2  -0.083 -0.154 -0.125 -0.168 -0.144 -0.117 -0.138 -0.138 
D5  -0.125 -0.179 -0.180 -0.167 -0.147 -0.128 -0.197 -0.194 
D8  -0.132 -0.181 -0.192 -0.150 -0.151 -0.150 -0.217 -0.235 
  FR    NL    
  1982 1991 1995 1979 1989 1996 
D2  -0.079 -0.088 -0.076 -0.121 -0.144 -0.187 
D5  -0.118 -0.114 -0.123 -0.143 -0.156 -0.178 
D8  -0.138 -0.111 -0.143 -0.159 -0.148 -0.162 
 
Quantile regressions estimated from national microdata, wage coefficients turned into 
percentage pay differentials. Controlled for hotels and restaurants, female, three skills levels, 
5 experience categories 
 
The third stage in the analysis probed the differentials even further by estimating the pay 
penalties in retail for different characteristics and at different points in the distribution. 
There is no reason to suppose that the retail penalty for being low skilled for example will 
be the same as for the high skilled, and it may be that the low skilled at the bottom of the 
distribution are the most vulnerable to very low pay. This involved separate wage equations 
for retail and for the whole economy. Then the differences in wages between retail and the 
rest of the economy were decomposed into the retail pay penalties suffered by each group 
(such as the least skilled) and the impact of the various composition differences in the 
workforce (larger number of unskilled in retail and so forth). Again since these effects can all 
vary between different points in the distribution, these regressions were estimated for 
different decile points. The equation involved a number of interactions, and a Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition was made to determine the contributions of  the elements of employment 
structure on the one hand and of the array of retail pay penalties for the various worker 
characteristics on the other hand28. 
                                                  
n i
28   The basic equation for the estimation was: 
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Table 6.4 presents the results of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the wage differentials 
between retail trade and the whole economy for the earliest and latest years, at the median 
(results for D2 are similar). In 1997 German retail workers at the median wage were paid 
some 28% less on average than workers in the economy overall and this raw differential was 
bigger in the USA (38%)29. The impact of the rewards penalty for retail seems to amount to 
much less than half this gap (in 1997 13% in Germany, 17% in the USA) while the differing 
composition contributes considerably more (16 as against 25%). Interestingly the rewards 
for low skills contribute very little in the USA, in 1979 as well as 1997; high skills contribute 
more. Indeed the lack of high-skilled made a bigger contribution to holding down the wage 
bill, especially in the USA, than the above average number of low skilled. The pay penalty for 
intermediate skills in Germany is rather more important. Although experienced workers 
have a much bigger penalty in the USA, the main effect on both countries is the large 
presence of part-time workers compared to the rest of the economy. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
θ w Here   stands for earnings at quantile θ  and EXP for potential experience.   
(n  =  1,…,3) are (0,1)-dummy variables  for male workers with low, intermediate and high skills, 
respectively, while   (n  =  4,…,6) denote corresponding variables for the  three skill 
categories of female workers. The above equation was estimated by quantile regressions. Since the 
German data are top-coded at the social contribution ceiling, we used Powell´s method of censored 
least absolute deviations instead of the normal quantile regression approach. 
n DSKILL
n DSKILL
29   Lack of detailed hours data for Germany means that these estimations refer to monthly wages for both 
countries. To the extent that workers in retailing work shorter hours this raw differential is 
exaggerated (and the effect may vary across countries). Some part of this hours effect is caught in the 
compositional effect for part-time workers which has a rather similar impact in the two countries. 
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   USA 1979  Germany 1979 
Skill-Effect -0.084  -0.051  0.015  -0.120  -0.200  -0.062 0.016  -0.246 
    Low  0.009 -0.010  0.000 -0.018 -0.081 -0.001  0.034 -0.048 
    Medium    -0.042 -0.008 -0.004 -0.054 -0.111 -0.045 -0.024 -0.180 
    High  -0.033 -0.034  0.019 -0.048 -0.008 -0.015  0.006 -0.017 
Part-Time  0.009  -0.123 0.009  -0.105 0.012  -0.068 0.017  -0.039 
Experience  -0.053 -0.068  0.006 -0.115  0.078 -0.033 -0.055 -0.011 
Total -0.129  -0.241  0.030  -0.340  -0.110 -0.163 -0.023  -0.295 
   USA 1997  Germany 1997 
Skill-Effect  -0.074 -0.084  0.025 -0.133 -0.110 -0.034  0.012 -0.117 
  Low   -0.003  -0.015  -0.001  -0.019  -0.010  0.009  0.010  0.009 
    Medium  -0.016 -0.014 -0.002 -0.032 -0.086 -0.014  0.006 -0.094 
    High  -0.055 -0.056  0.028 -0.082 -0.015 -0.029  0.012 -0.032 
Part-Time  0.001  -0.101 0.001  -0.099 0.017  -0.083 0.018  -0.049 
Experience  -0.097 -0.065  0.014 -0.148 -0.031 -0.047 -0.032 -0.110 
Total -0.170  -0.251  0.040  -0.380  -0.125 -0.164  0.014  -0.276 
   France 1982  Netherlands 1979 
Skill-Effect  0.00 -0.044  0.004 -0.040 -0.110 -0.083 -0.037 -0.230 
    Low  0.006 -0.000  0.005  0.011 -0.113 -0.041 -0.028 -0.182 
  Medium   -0.008  -0.006  0.001  -0.013  -0.011  -0.001  0.003  -0.009 
    High  0.001 -0.037 -0.002 -0.038  0.014 -0.040 -0.013 -0.039 
Part-Time  -0.015  -0.013 0.002  -0.026 0.002  -0.119 0.003  -0.113 
Experience  -0.078 -0.039 -0.007 -0.124  0.013 -0.089  0.017 -0.060 
Total  -0.093 -0.096 -0.001  -0.189  -0.094 -0.291 -0.017  -0.403 
   France 1995  Netherlands 1996 
Skill-Effect  -0.055 -0.068  0.016 -0.106 -0.228 -0.083  0.006 -0.305 
  Low   -0.009  0.004  0.004  0.000  -0.076  -0.025  -0.034  -0.135 
    Medium  -0.024 -0.017 -0.002 -0.042 -0.077 -0.003 -0.016 -0.096 
    High  -0.022 -0.055  0.014 -0.064 -0.075 -0.054  0.056 -0.075 
Part-Time  -0.015  0.004 -0.003 -0.014 -0.023 -0.159 -0.017 -0.198 
Experience  -0.064 -0.055 -0.001 -0.119  0.088 -0.143  0.003 -0.052 
Total -0.134  -0.119  0.013  -0.239  -0.162 -0.385 -0.008  -0.555 
   UK 1989/90 
Skill-Effect -0.135  -0.076  0.026  -0.185 
  Low  -0.047  -0.016  0.001  -0.062 
  Medium   -0.049  -0.003  -0.004  -0.056 
  High  -0.039  -0.057  0.029  -0.067 
Part-Time -0.012  -0.191  0.010  -0.193 
Experience 0.030  -0.236  -0.019  -0.225 
Total -0.117  -0.503  0.017  -0.603 
   UK 1998/2001 
Skill-Effect -0.138  -0.095  0.025  -0.209 
  Low   -0.023  -0.022  -0.002  -0.047 
  Medium  -0.042  -0.023  -0.012  -0.078 
  High  -0.073  -0.050  0.039  -0.084 
Part-Time 0.002  -0.251  0.008  -0.242 
Experience -0.037  -0.083  0.010  -0.110 
Total -0.173  -0.429  0.042  -0.561 
 
The pattern of effects was really pretty stable in the USA, but the raw differential and the 
rewards effect both increased. It fell somewhat in Germany. There were a number of 
substantial changes including the near elimination of a large retail pay penalty for the least 
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skilled after 1979. However since in the USA the least skilled never had a large penalty this 
merely brought Germany in to line with the USA rather than representing a greater degree 
of wage compression which could explain lower German employment. 
The results for France, the Netherlands and the UK offer a range that encompasses the 
USA. France had smaller but growing raw differentials. The Netherlands and the UK had pay 
penalties comparable to the USA and significantly larger raw differentials as a consequence of 
larger composition effects which are strongly rooted in experience and part-time work. The 
latter is virtually absent in France. 
We are not suggesting as a conclusion that labour market regulations play no role, but 
overall the patterns described above do not accord with the general ideas about the 
importance of the pay differential for low skills nor with the picture of inflexible European 
labour markets being the dominating influence inhibiting retail expansion. 
 
6.2 PRODUCTIVITY AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
If distribution-services employment was being inhibited by labour market inflexibilities this 
should be reflected in labour productivity being too high or having grown too fast. More 
flexible wages should have resulted in less substitution of capital for labour and/or less 
substitution of skilled labour for unskilled labour. Both of these would have reduced the 
growth of labour productivity and increased employment. Comparing such trends in Europe 
and the USA should provide evidence for what is constraining employment. 
Changes in the volume of distribution-services output within countries are typically 
measured by deflating measures of current price sales by retail price indices to obtain sales 
volumes. Indices for different types of stores are then weighted by the average gross margin 
(assuming that differences in margin at a point in time reflect differences in the output 
produced by the store). The index for total real sales is linked to base-year current-price 
value added to obtain value added at constant prices as published in National Accounts. This 
in turn is used with employment data to construct labour productivity etc. The underlying 
assumption is that the quantity and quality of service per real dollar of sales remains constant 
over time30, which is controversial. A more recent refinement in measurement has been to 
apply double deflation to this sector, so that changes in the real use of intermediate inputs 
(but not quality changes) are taken into account. 
Table 6.5 (left panel) reports the data for the growth of labour productivity in distribution 
services as calculated by Mary O’Mahony (2002). In the 1970s continental Europe appeared 
to have distinctly higher productivity growth in distribution services than did the USA. This 
was true also for the economy as a whole and included the final burst of “catch-up” of 
                                                  
30   Fuchs, 1968, Chapter 5. 
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productivity to American levels. This was also the era of wage pressure, a rising NAIRU and 
a profit squeeze throughout Europe. These developments may very well have put pressure 
on employment in distribution services as in other sectors. 
 
Table 6.5  Growth of hourly labour productivity and capital/labour ratios 
annual average (%) 
  Productivity Capital/labour 
 
Distri-
bution    
Distri-
bution    
    
Retail   
trade 
Hotels &  
catering    




USA           
1970-79  1.5 2.3 -1.6  1.5 1.9  -2.1 
1979-90  2.1 2.5 -0.4  2.3 1.7 0.8 
1990-99  3.7 3.1  0.4  3.1 2.8 1.6 
UK           
1970-79  1.5 1.9 -1.4  3.9 5.0 2.1 
1979-90  2.0 2.5 -0.2  4.1 5.1 2.6 
1990-99  1.9 1.8 -1.3  4.2 4.3 3.5 
France            
1970-79  3.2    1.9  3.9 3.3 3.7 
1979-90  1.9   -0.1  3.2 3.5 3.0 
1990-99  0.6   -1.3  2.1 2.0 1.1 
W. Germany/Germany 
1970-79  3.4 4.2  1.4  3.0 3.2 2.8 
1979-90  1.8 2.2  0.3  1.3 1.7  -0.4 
1990-99  0.5 0.7 -3.9  2.2 2.5 0.2 
Netherlands (per FTE) 
1970-79 3.7        
1979-90 1.7        
1990-99 1.4  1.7  -0.4     
Source: Mary O’Mahony (2002) and Netherlands author’s calculations from STAN 2003 
 
This pattern, however, did not persist into the 1980s when productivity in distribution 
services grew at very comparable rates in Europe and USA. So there is no suggestion that 
distribution-services employment in Europe was being inhibited by “excessive” productivity 
growth as compared to the USA. In the 1990s the contrast is even stronger. Productivity in 
US distribution services steamed ahead, 2-3% per year faster than in France, Germany and 
Netherlands, under the pressure of Walmart and aided by the introduction of new 
technologies (see Nordhaus 2002, McKinsey 2002). French and German productivity growth 
was also distinctly slower than in the UK where labour market deregulation had proceeded 
far down the American road. In Europe labour productivity growth in distribution services 
has also been distinctly slower than in manufacturing, which is not the case in the USA (or in 
the UK in the 1990s). If inflexible labour markets were preventing the employment of low–
wage labour in Europe this would be expected to have a stronger impact in distribution 
services than manufacturing. This should then show up in distribution-services productivity 
performing more strongly in Europe relative to manufacturing than was the case in the more 
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flexible USA and UK – the opposite of the observed pattern. Obviously many other factors 
influence productivity but this set of productivity data does not provide unambiguous 
support for the view that rigid labour markets inhibited employment growth in European 
low-skill services31. 
Inflexible labour markets by raising labour costs could encourage capital/labour substitution 
and therefore labour productivity growth. Was capital/labour substitution stronger in the 
low-paid service sectors in Europe than in the USA? The O’Mahony data set provides 
disaggregated capital series constructed around a common set of assumptions and we 
reproduce (Table 6.5, right panel) data on the growth of the capital/labour ratio. 
In the 1970s the capital/labour ratio grew distinctly faster in distribution services in Europe 
than in the USA (a similar pattern to that for labour productivity noted above). This trend 
continued in France in the 1980s, but not in Germany; even in France the rate of capital 
intensification was less than in the UK where deregulation was proceeding apace. In the 
1990s the growth of capital intensity was less in France and Germany than in the USA and 
much less than in the UK. Labour input is measured in terms of employment rather than 
total hours worked because this is probably the better measure of the capital intensity of the 
production process32. Given the faster decline in hours of work in Europe, measuring capital 
intensity in relation to total hours worked increases the sharpness of the rise in Europe in 
the 1970s especially. But by the 1990s adjusting for average hours makes little difference to 
these international comparisons and the conclusion stands of at least no faster increase in 
capital intensity in distribution services in continental Europe than in the USA. 
 
                                                  
31   The qualification about the data set is important. The O’Mahony data set was very carefully constructed 
for productivity analysis from national and OECD sources (including STAN). However the latest STAN 
yields a different pattern for productivity growth over the last two decades (France and USA were the 
only countries with hours data in STAN). The STAN results for the USA for the last period are very 
surprising and seem to conflict with the national data. But even if this STAN data for France was 
correct, productivity was growing no faster there than the USA according to the O’Mahony data. The 
productivity data we have constructed (G&S, see below) shows the same pattern in the USA and 
France as O’Mahony. This variability of results across data sets underlines how tentative conclusions 
should be. 
 
Hourly productivity growth in 













    France  2.8  3.1  1.9  0.6  2.8  0.8 
    USA  1.6  1.7  2.1  3.7  0.9  2.1 
 
32   This will be true to the extent that the utilisation of capital is correlated with average hours worked 
per employee (so that a declining working week is associated with declining hours of utilisation). 
62  
Table 6.6  Capital/labour ratios, levels in 1999 
x 1000 per person employed (1996 $) 
  USA Germany  France  UK 
Distribution services  40   32   55  23 
Retail  29   28   54  19 
Retail relative to manufacturing  0.34   0.43   0.56  0.31 
Source: Mary O’Mahony (2002) 
 
Comparisons of changes in capital intensity will typically be more robust than comparisons 
of levels, since levels are more dependent on assumptions about asset lives and in addition 
there is the complication of calculating Purchasing Power Parities for capital stocks. Bearing 
these provisos in mind, the O’Mahony set allows the following comparisons (Table 6.6) for 
capital intensity in distribution services in total and in retail. 
According to these data the capital/labour ratio is no higher in German distribution services 
and retail than it is in the USA despite much higher labour costs in Germany. The UK has 
lower capital intensity as would be expected from its low-wage/low-investment reputation. 
These data suggest very high capital intensity indeed in France. But if this was mainly a 
reflection of labour market inflexibilities in France then a similar pattern would be expected 
for Germany. The only hint in the German data of capital intensification in low–wage 
services is that the ratio of capital intensity in retail relative to manufacturing is rather higher 
than in the USA and UK. If inflexibility in labour markets bears more heavily on low-wage 
services than on high-wage manufacturing (which is rather plausible) then some effect of this 
sort would be expected. Even so, there is no consistent picture of higher capital intensities 
in continental Europe nor of the higher or faster growing labour productivity which should 
be associated with it. 
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Table 6.7  Hourly product wages 
Annual averages (%) 
     Distri-bution  Retail trade  Hotels & catering 
USA        
1970-79   1.3  2.2  -1.7 
1979-90   2.1  1.9  -0.5 
1990-99   2.7  2.2  -1.3 
UK        
1970-79   1.7     
1979-90   1.7     
1990-99   2.1  1.8  -1.3 
France        
1970-79   4.6    2.7 
1979-90   1.2    -0.2 
1990-99   0.4    -1.8 
W. Germany/Germany     
1970-79   4.6  4.2  1.4 
1979-90   2.5  3.6  0.8 
1990-99   0.1  -0.5  -3.9 
Netherlands (FTE based)    
1970-79   3.9     
1979-90   -0.6     
1990-99   1.8     
Source: calculated from Mary O’Mahony 2002 as the sum of the growth rate of hourly labour productivity and the growth 
rate of labour’s share in value added (adjusted for self-employment) and for the Netherlands from STAN. 
 
Finally we examined the pattern of increases in real labour costs. These are measured in 
terms of “product wages”, that is money wages deflated by the price index for value added 
in the sector concerned. 
In parallel to the results for productivity and capital intensity, product wages in distribution 
services rose rapidly in France, Germany and the Netherlands in the 1970s and represented 
a substantial squeeze on profits as labour’s share rose strongly. However in the 1980s 
product-wage growth slowed down, and was even negative in the Netherlands, and was no 
faster than in the USA and UK. In the 1990s product wages hardly grew at all in Germany 
and France while moving up relatively quickly in USA and UK with the Netherlands in 
between. Labour’s share as found in National Accounts tended to decline steadily in Europe 
– by the end of the period it was as low in French distribution services as in British, a finding 
consistent with the high capital intensity noted above. Germany stands out in Europe in that 
labour ‘s share didn’t decline in distribution services over the past twenty years – an element 
of “inflexibility” not shared by France. 
 
6.3 EMPLOYMENT IN DISTRIBUTION SERVICES AND THE GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
In comparing the evolution of employment across countries it is most helpful to have an 
internationally comparable measure of production. The national measures of productivity 
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used in the previous section do not readily lend themselves to international comparison. 
Existing attempts to measure sectoral productivity by value added deflated by a PPP for 
appropriate expenditure categories are very seriously flawed. As argued in the underlying 
working paper such measures depend on productivity in the whole economy rather than 
measuring efficiency in the sector33. Sales of goods are the fundamental “throughput” into 
distribution services and this suggests a natural if crude measure of productivity in 
distribution services across countries – consumers expenditure on goods at international 
PPP prices, per person employed (or hour worked) in distribution services. Moreover 
measuring productivity by “goods consumption per hour” facilitates a very simple 
decomposition of the determinants of employment in distribution services into goods 
consumption on the one hand and labour productivity in distribution services on the other: 
 
                                                  
33   See Glyn et al. 2004, Appendix C, also for data construction and other caveats. 
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Hours Worked in Distribution  =   Consumption of Goods   x  Hours in Distribution
    Population of Working Age        Pop of Working Age         Consumption of Goods 
 
Consumption of goods per head of the working population can be thought of as 
representing the demand for distribution services, in turn reflecting per capita incomes, 
taxation and savings, choices between goods and services etc. Consumption of goods per 
hour worked in distribution services is a gross output measure of labour productivity. It 
does not cope with the subtleties of different types of distribution services, though in 
principle it can. However this decomposition does allow us to see whether the 
“employment deficit” in European distribution services is mainly due to low throughput (low 
consumption of goods) or to high productivity and how these factors have influenced 
comparative employment trends over time. 
 
The USA already had more employment in distribution services 30 years ago but the 
differences have subsequently increased rather dramatically as work in distribution services 
in the USA has grown rather steadily, whilst there has been little overall trend in Europe 
except in France where distribution-services work has declined. By 1999 work in 
distribution services per head was 304 hours, 239 in UK, 217 in Germany and 175-180 in 
France and Netherlands. So the USA had around least 25% more distribution-services work 
per head of the population than the UK and nearly 75% more than France and Netherlands – 
truly enormous differences. 
 
The above decomposition focuses on goods consumption per capita and productivity in 
distribution services. Figure 6.2 shows the former. American goods consumption per capita 
was around one half greater than the European level in 1970 and if anything the gap has 
increased. There was some catching by Europe in the 1970s and again in the boom at the 
end of the 1980s, but Europe fell further behind when the USA boomed in the 1990s. There 
is an obvious impact of German unification in lowering per capita consumption. The 
differences between the USA and Europe in per capita consumption of goods are really 
dramatic. If productivity in distribution services in 1999 was the same in the USA and Europe 
there would have still have been 50–60% more hours worked in American distribution 
services than in Europe to service the higher throughput of goods. 
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Figure 6.2  Consumer spending on goods (x1000, international prices PPP) 
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Figure 6.3  Labour productivity in distribution services relative to USA, USA=1 
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Our internationally comparable measures of labour productivity, consumption of goods in 
PPP prices per distribution-services hour worked, are shown relative to the US level in 
Figure 6.3. After some catching up in the 1970s it seems that productivity levels in 
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Continental Europe were close to those in the USA by 1980 though still well below in UK34. 
French productivity then rose somewhat above the US level, but Europe fell back in the 
1990s as productivity in distribution services boomed in the USA.35 High French productivity 
exacerbates the employment gap with the USA, whereas lower productivity in the UK 
offsets the impact of lower consumption per head. 
The influence of rising productivity relative to the USA before 1990, and the persistent very 
low level of goods consumption stand out as the dominating influences on employment in 
distribution services. In the period 1990-1999 consumption per head of the population of 
working age grew around 15% slower in both France and Germany than in the USA – it was 
only slower growth of distribution-services productivity in Europe that prevented a major 
further widening in the distribution-services employment gap over that period. 
Across the four European countries as a whole it is clear that goods consumption per capita 
is now the most important proximate factor behind lower employment in distribution 
services. Does this just reflect lower per capita GDP, or a smaller consumption share or a 
bias within consumption against goods? The latter possibility can be dismissed immediately. 
Europe shows a consistent tendency for goods to constitute a higher proportion of total 
consumption than in the USA. One likely explanation of the higher goods share in Europe is 
the greater provision of services by the state (which means that expenditure on such 
services is not observed as part of household consumption). Some convergence towards the 
American level means that by the end of the period the impact of goods bias was pretty 
small. Turning to the second influence on goods consumption, the ratio of total consumption 
to GDP is distinctly smaller in Europe and here the differences have fanned out with the UK 
moving towards USA during the consumer boom of the second half of the 1990s, whilst the 
Dutch share fell further. 
The twin influences of the consumption share and goods share of consumption can be 
helpfully combined into consumption of goods as a ratio of GDP – this combined measure 
makes sense since the effect of a high share of state provision of services will tend to both 
reduce the share of consumption in GDP and (as a partial offset) increase the share of goods 
in personal consumption (as some services are now financed by the tax system). The results 
are interesting (Figure 6.4): for Germany and the UK goods consumption is only a little 
lower as share of GDP than in the USA, whilst for France and especially the Netherlands the 
differences are large and contribute materially to low employment in distribution services. 
                                                  
34   The broad pattern of productivity trends over time is consistent with that based on the standard 
measures of national productivity, which are not internationally comparable in terms of levels. 
35   Nordhaus  (2002) shows that about one half of the acceleration in US labour productivity growth in the 
“New Economy” period of  1995-2000 took place in wholesale and retail. Part of the explanation lies in 
the boom in the “volume” of computer sales (measured using hedonic price indices), but part probably 
does reflect “genuine” productivity gains reflecting very heavy IT spending in that sector. 
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This leaves per capita GDP as the final influence on goods consumption and therefore 
distribution-services employment. The decline in German GDP per capita with unification 
contributed to a convergence within Europe and by the end of the period American GDP 
per capita was about one-third above all the European countries. This was the dominant 
factor behind lower consumption of goods per head in Germany and UK, exacerbated by 
lower shares of consumption of goods in GDP in France and particularly in Netherlands. 
Obviously GDP per capita reflects many factors but the dominant ones in these cases are 
low employment rates and hours of work overall, with economy-wide hourly productivity 
levels being fairly similar. 
A simple way of summarizing these results is to tabulate (Table 6.8) a decomposition of 
differences in distribution-services employment compared to the USA into differences in per 
capita; GDP, goods consumption as a share of GDP and labour productivity. Distribution-
services work particularly in Netherlands and France is held back by the low ratio of goods 
consumption, in France by high productivity and throughout Europe by low per capita GDP. 
 
Table 6.8  Summary of distribution-services work per head of population, 1999 
Compared to USA 









(USA compared to country) 
Germany  0.717 0.709  0.903  1.121 
France  0.574 0.710  0.863  0.937 
UK  0.790 0.698  0.945  1.197 
Netherlands  0.594 0.762  0.728  1.074 
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We noted earlier that our measure of labour productivity as goods consumption or 
“throughput” per hour worked is a rough one. More sophisticated measures, which mostly 
have severe conceptual limitations, can give rather different answers as the background 
working paper shows. They typically give France a bigger productivity lead over the USA in 
distribution services than that shown above. If such a measure (for example Van Ark’s 
double-deflated estimate) was preferred, how would Table 6.8 be altered? Obviously the last 
column would be different (a lower number in the French row for example) and to complete 
the decomposition an extra column would have to be added to reflect “service added by 
distribution services per consumption good sold” which would precisely offset the different 
productivity number (one could think of this “true productivity” as reflecting goods sold per 
hour plus the extra factor “service per good sold”). Even though such service differences 
may well exist, it is hard believe that it will be well captured in the measures available, and so 
it seems clearer stick with the simpler analysis presented here. 
 
This section highlighted the central importance of the level of consumption in shaping 
differences in distribution-services employment between the USA and Europe. Total volume 
of work in distribution per capita is much higher in the USA because per capita consumption 
is much higher (see Gordon 2002) This discrepancy has grown as productivity in distribution 
(as best we can measure it) caught up to US levels in the 1970s and US consumption per 
capita drew further ahead in the 1990s. By contrast the gap in the share of distribution in 
total employment (not shown) was both smaller and much more stable and appears to 
reflect systematic structural features making for a low share of goods consumption in 
Europe with productivity levels in distribution relative to the national average, playing a 
relatively minor role. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS ON WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY AND DEMAND IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION SECTOR 
The services employment gap has been concentrated in distribution and community and 
personal services and particular attention has been focused here on the role of labour 
market rigidities in inhibiting the growth of the former. The detailed examination of the 
wages and employment in retailing suggests that differences between the USA and Europe 
are not consistently in the direction anticipated by the rigidities/wage-compression 
hypothesis; the wage penalties for employment in retail are not much greater in the USA and 
pay differentials for low skills are relatively unimportant. On the more macroeconomic level 
European distribution did initially suffer from rapid growth in product wages and a profit 
squeeze and this may have held back employment growth in France in particular, but in the 
1990s in particular productivity grew considerably faster in distribution in the USA and 
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product wages grew relatively slowly in Europe. Finally we showed that the much higher 
level of goods consumption per head of the population (the “throughput” in distribution) as 
compared to Europe was the dominating influence in explaining the much higher levels of 
employment in US distribution. Even in France where it appears that labour productivity in 
distribution may be somewhat higher than in the USA this factor is much less important in 
explaining low employment than is low goods consumption. This suggests that the lower 
level of services employment in Europe may be more importantly explained by the 
macroeconomic influences explaining low levels of consumption rather than specific 





7.1 DEMPATEM’S SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
First, we return to the DEMPATEM questions that were mentioned at the end of the 
introduction and list the answers that we have found. We end with a number of general 
observations. 
 
The DEMPATEM questions 
1) Does the higher share of service industries in employment in the USA derive from a 
larger role of services in the structure of final demand, and is this gap growing? 
 
The USA have a higher share of services in final demand of about 10%-points but all 
countries show a trend towards more services in final demand. 
 
There is a clear trend towards a higher share of services in final demand also in constant 
prices within countries. Using constant instead of current prices flattens the trend towards 
more services in final demand but it remains upward. The lead of the USA in the service 
share in final demand occurs in current and in constant prices but it seems stable over 
time. 
 
The bigger service sector in the USA occurs in different data sets. Also as a share in value 
added the service sector in the USA is bigger than in Europe. 
 
Overall services rise in relative prices whereas overall goods prices are falling in every 
country. Some service prices rise more than the average, but not all. 
Relative prices for goods rather than for services seem to be lower in the USA than in 
Europe. This is mainly the result of relatively low prices for health and education in 
Europe, where they are usually mixed public-private services. Other services, especially 
‘market services’ have substantially lower relative prices in the USA. 
Measured in international prices the gap in relative service demand between the USA and 
the European countries narrows but does not go away. 
 
2) Particularly, is consumer demand higher and growing more rapidly in the US? What 
is its impact on the production of services? 
and 
3) What is the role of the pattern of household consumption in this? That is, do 
American households consume more services than European households and why? 
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In all countries, private consumption is the most important demand component for 
services followed by government consumption. Taken together they account for about 80 
to 95 per cent of all final demand for services. 
 
Imports (and exports) of services are marginal in overall final demand and in household 
final consumption. 
 
In the USA the share of private consumption in the overall demand for services is 
especially high, which favours the share of services in final demand.  
 
Especially the share of services in private consumption grew in the USA. 
 
There is a clear trade-off between private and public expenditures on services depending 
on the national institutional arrangements. In part American households spend a higher 
share of their disposable incomes on services because they need to buy services which are 
provided publicly in Europe. 
 
The share of individual consumption in total public consumption is much higher in Europe 
than in the USA. ‘Pure’ collective consumption in GDP is roughly similar in all countries. If 
anything it is higher in the USA. 
 
There is no clear pattern in the American-European difference of private final 
consumption. Even in categories where public provision is unimportant (like ‘restaurants, 
hotels’) the pattern is diverse. The UK and France have higher expenditure shares, 
Germany and the Netherlands have lower shares than the USA. 
 
The employment share in services seems to be influenced by the relative service 
productivity, which may be related to differences in skill structure and/or capital 
deepening. 
 
Demand per head of the population of working age is about 40% higher in the USA than in 
Europe, which affects both goods and services. 
 
A higher share in nominal final demand for services between points in time or between to 
countries may occur because: 
o  The taste for services is more pronounced 
o  Income is higher (but relative prices and indifference curves are similar) 
o  Relative prices of services are lower (but indifference curves are homothetic across 
countries) 
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o  The structure of final demand components is more in favour of services 
o  Marketization of household production activities is more advanced (this may affect 
also the final demand components). 
 
4) What determines the pattern of consumption? What role do household 
characteristics play, including labour participation, income inequality and consumer 
attitudes? 
 
A uniform approach to consumption patterns – much effort was put into that – shows an 
amazingly large role for expenditures on housing in all countries, both in levels and in 
changes over time. This mainly rests on imputed rent for occupier-owned housing and 
cannot be observed directly. To the extent that this is classified as services this serves as a 
caveat for any study of the role of growing services. 
 
The composition of the population by a uniform set of households types differs between 
countries but the differences tend to diminish. The share of singles is increasing universally 
while that of traditional one-earner couples with children is falling. Amazingly, the share of 
two-earner couples also fell in the USA. 
 
Joblessness of households is much less in the US; employment participation rates differ 
substantially more between the USA and Europe for singles than for couples. 
 
Changes in consumption patterns have more to do with rising levels of expenditures and 
shifts in relative prices and preferences than with the changing composition of households. 
Price effects, which support Baumol’s view, are quite substantial in some countries but not 
in all. Demographic changes accounted for 10 to 20 per cent of the observed change in 
consumption patterns. 
 
The analysis of the budget surveys confirmed that services are a luxury as their demand 
grows with increasing budgets, but this does not apply to all services; also, various goods 
are luxuries as well while mainly the spending on food and beverages has a declining share. 
 
Rising income inequality between households had virtually no effect on the patterns of 
consumer demand. In most countries, including the US, households with low expenditures 
registered a larger increase in real total expenditures. 
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Household participation in employment explains very little indeed of the changing patterns 
of consumer demand, in spite of the substantial differences across countries and the rapid 
changes occurring in some countries. 
 
5) How does consumer spending on services translate into the structure of production 
and employment? 
 
On the basis of vertically integrated sectors (VIS) the relative employment-friendliness of 
demand in individual sectors remained fairly constant over time within individual countries 
and fairly similar across countries. The European economies are, however, rather more 
similar to each other than to the USA.  
 
Strikingly, the employment-intensities of services and manufacturing are broadly equal, 
when measured on a VIS basis. 
 
Demand originating in both manufacturing and services is increasingly generating jobs 
located in services. 
 
Within the individual economies the changing patterns of final demand have been 
employment-friendly in the European economies, but employment-neutral in the USA. 
 
The changing pattern of consumption has been significantly less employment-friendly 
everywhere. The changing mix of consumption has, in general, been only a minor source of 
employment growth within each economy. 
 
The final demand mixes of the UK, the Netherlands and Spain would generate higher 
employment in the USA than the American pattern. Only the demand patterns of France 
and Germany would reduce it, and then only marginally. 
 
The consumption patterns of France and Germany would reduce US employment by 5 to 
7 per cent. The patterns from the UK and Spain would have little effect. 
 
The US mix of final demand applied to the European economy would result in lower 
employment. 
 
If the US consumption mix were adopted in Europe employment would increase. The 




The level of demand, including its changing mix, is the major source of employment growth. 
 
Structural change, along the supply chain, including outsourcing, both creates and destroys 
jobs. The net effect is small. 
 
In the USA demand growth has been more strongly job-creating and productivity gains 
have been less strongly job-destroying than in the European economies, opening up the 
employment gap. 
 
6) What is the structure of employment in these industries by skills, gender, age, and 
pay? And how does this depend on female labour supply? 
 
Services are of prime importance for the present employment gap, but mainly because 
European employment in manufacturing and agriculture shrunk much more than in the 
USA. Also in a historical perspective these two sectors shrunk much faster than in the 
USA. 
 
The services gap per se grew relatively little and notably decreased in recent years. 
 
The services gap is located primarily in community and personal services and in 
distribution services (trade, hotels and restaurants). The former is a mix between public 
and private financing of demand, the latter is purely private in all countries. 
 
In distribution services the effects of wage (in)flexibility and skills, productivity and 
consumer demand come together, retail trade is the part where this holds most strongly. 
 
In retail employment all countries have high concentrations of the low skilled, women, 
youth and part-time workers. The extent of concentration differs internationally but it 
seems stable over time in the individual countries. Women play a particularly large role in 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
 
Average pay in retail relative to the national average is not widely different. Subsequent 
estimations of the wage structure of retailing relative to the rest of the economy provided 
no convincing evidence that American retailing can profit from higher wage flexibility. 
Notably, no particular contribution was found for low- skill pay differentials nor for pay 
differentials at the bottom end of the wage distribution (2nd decile). Differentials higher up 
the skills ladder are more important. Employment composition effects, especially regarding 
part-time work and experience, make an important contribution to international 
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differences. However, they are more important for the Netherlands and the UK than for 
the USA. 
 
Productivity levels that were estimated for distribution showed a rapid growth in Europe 
during the 1970s but no further increase compared to the USA since. In France the level 
of productivity seems to be higher and thus contributes to the employment gap. 
 
The much higher macroeconomic level of goods consumption per capita in the USA as 
compared to Europe is particularly important for explaining the volume of retail 
employment across the countries. This substantially mitigates the contribution as a 
potential constraint of wages and productivity. 
 
7.2 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Professor Jan Tinbergen described economic development as a race between productivity 
gains, the supply side, and demand expansion. If the latter dominates employment expands 
and this seems to be the case for services. Although service prices rise more than goods 
prices – an indication for lower productivity growth in services – the demand share for 
services rose in all countries. This is one fact of the DEMPATEM research established with 
various methods and data sources at the aggregate and at the micro level. Higher income 
per capita seems to lead to a higher demand for services even if price trends are eliminated, 
which is challenging earlier findings that the service share in final demand in real terms is 
constant. Clearly, American private households spend a higher share of their income on 
services but in part this differences is an accounting artefact because European households 
receive some services through public provision. 
 
All ‘DEMPATEM’ countries are experiencing similar trends with respect to service-sector 
expansion and a relative decline of manufacturing. Figure 7.1 summarizes these trends in 
supply-demand space for industry (manufacturing plus construction and utilities) and 
services. All countries experienced productivity increases in manufacturing and in all 
countries the supply effect was not fully compensated for by expanding demand, which 
resulted in lower manufacturing employment (per head of population) in all countries (i.e., all 
countries are below the iso-employment curve of the USA in 1970, the solid line). Since 
many European countries were above the US ‘manufacturing iso-employment’ curve in 1970, 
the decline of manufacturing employment was stronger in DEMPATEM-Europe than in the 
USA. However, not the demand for manufacturing goods fell – this increased even slightly – 
but goods demand expanded less than production capacity (productivity) increased. 
For services the pattern is different. All countries experienced increases in service demand 
of roughly similar rates – that is, they moved up vertically – but in the European countries 
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productivity gains were stronger than in the USA. Although they reduced average working 
hours in services, the service-employment rate (persons employed in services per head of 
population) rose less than in the USA in France, Germany and Spain and at roughly similar 
rates in the Netherlands and the UK. This left these countries with lower service-
employment rates than the USA. 
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Not so much the increases in per-capita demand in the USA but rather the rise in the 
employment rate with roughly constant working hours is most surprising. The USA moved 
to a higher level of demand, which was to a large extent achieved by growing labour inputs, 
i.e. higher participation rates. In per capita terms, overall actual individual consumption in the 
USA – using the OECD 1999 PPP benchmark – is about 30 percentage-points higher than in 
the European countries, roughly in line with the difference in GDP per capita and with 
differences in labour input (which are roughly divided 50:50 between the employment rates 
and average working hours). Why did the USA raise its output and labour input, while in 
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European economies overall hours worked per head of population even declined?36 This 
seems to be the major puzzle in comparison to the European economies. 
 
Table 7.1: Consumption levels in 1999 PPPs, USA = 100  
 
Source: computations based on OECD 2002. 
 
In consumer goods the overall difference in consumption per capita between the USA and 
DEMPATEM-Europe is small, but major differences occur in services. These differences, 
however, are far from being uniform across the European countries. Except for Spain, clear 
patterns only occur in housing, health, education and hotels/ restaurants. Europeans spend 
only about 50% of the US level in hotels and restaurants, while in housing, health and 
education they consume more (see Table 7.1). These are consumption figures expressed in 
PPPs, i.e. they differ from expenditures for these products expressed in national currencies. 
Consumption in PPPs is higher (lower) than expenditures in national currencies if national 
prices are lower (higher) in the country compared to the reference price. Prices may differ 
between countries because the wages paid in the relevant industry are lower or because 
production is more efficient. Therefore, the regulated European health sector may produce 
more efficiently than the American private health sector, which obviously does not fit the 
‘deregulated markets are most efficient’ ideology. The same seems to hold for many types of 
insurance (Stiglitz 2003). 
                                                  
36   From 1970 to 1999 hours worked per head of the working-age population rose in the US by about 
15%, in the Netherlands it remained roughly constant, but in Germany, France, Spain and the UK hours 
worked per head of population decreased (23%, 26%, 20%, and 15%). However, hours worked are not 
very precise statistics (see Appendix in Schettkat 2004). 
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Figure 7.2 Uni-modal versus multi-peaked fitness-institutions landscapes 
 
fitness
Private  Institutional arrangement    Public 
fitness
Private  Institutional arrangement    Public 
Source: inspired by Freeman 2000. 
 
From the individual’s perspective contributions to social insurances can be considered as 
‘taxes’ especially if social insurance leads to a high degree of redistribution among the 
insured. In a privately organized system the connection between service and expenditure is 
closer and contributions to private pension insurance are regarded as private expenditures. 
European economies tried to reduce the expansion of the welfare state with arguments such 
as ‘welfare states become unaffordable’, ‘welfare states destroy incentives’ and ‘private 
initiatives need to be enforced’ etc. Even if these claims are right, costs may dominate 
efficiency gains in the transition period. Only in a uni-modal efficiency-institutions landscape, 
where only one institutional arrangement is optimal this assertion can hold. If the efficiency-
institutions landscape has multiple peaks, that is several institutional arrangements can 
produce similar outcomes, the transition can be very costly because reaping the gains may 
require a long walk downhill and through valleys. Figure 7.2 illustrates this. 
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DEMPATEM has established evidence for commonalities but also for differences in 
consumption and final demand patterns in the USA and Europe. In their effects on 
employment, the differences in patterns seem to be quantitatively less important than 
differences in demand levels. Here an important shift has occurred: In the 1970s the USA 
achieved a higher per-capita income through higher productivity, but by the end of the last 
century European productivity had caught up with US levels and the American-European 
income and expenditures gap roughly corresponded to the labour-input gap. That gap is hard 
to explain with conventional macroeconomic arguments because it requires substantial 
changes in labour supply and consumption behaviour (see Freeman and Schettkat 2002). It 
remains a conundrum why in recent decades the USA raised labour input so much and why 
the European countries fail to achieve higher levels of participation but these issues are 
beyond the DEMPATEM program. 
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